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The theory and practice of constitutional limitations entail,
at least for the governments and officials of the United States and
its fifty states, an inability to be truly competent for international
purposes.' Perhaps even the term "incompetent" should be used
in the United States situation. Practically every nation's official
negotiator or representative eventually must report back to his
home office for instructions or authority; that is, he ordinarily does
not have the competency to conclude.2 However, frequently in
the United States, the home office, or the government itself, either
lacks the power to be exercised in a particular situation, or must
follow certain unduly restrictive procedures and limitations. Just
why is this so? What are some of these constricting constitutional
clauses? What are the judicial interpretations of them and the
practices developed under them?
* Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, University of Melbourne; Ful-
bright Scholar at the National University, Taiwan 1975-1976; LL.B. and LL.M.,
St. Johns University, School of Law; B.A. and M.A., Washington Square College;
J.S.D., New York University, School of Law; Ph.D. and M.S.Sc., Graduate Fac-
ulty, New School for Social Research. The manuscript was read in draft
by Professor Francis D. Wormuth, Political Science Department, University of
Utah, whose piercing criticisms were welcomed; he is not, however, responsible
for what appears.
1. We do not dwell extensively on "Internal sovereignty . . . [for] the
chief concern of international lawyers is external sovereignty .... ." G. Butler,
Sovereignty and the League of Nations, 1 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 35, 38 (1920-21).
Adumbration, not exegetical interpretation is the purpose of this paper.
Additionally, it is impossible to discuss limitations and constrictions without treat-
ing the question of powers. Therefore, powers and limitations are discussed to-
gether, although the concept of constitutional limitation is stressed.
2. See, UNITED STATES LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 31 JOURNALS OF CONTINEN-
TAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 611 (W. Ford, 1906), where Charles Pinckney in-
veighed against an allegedly unconstitutional removal of restrictions, in 1786, by
the Congress on the authority of John Jay, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in his
negotiations with the Spanish envoy concerning navigation on the Mississippi
River.
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There enters, it may be immediately suggested, a problem
created when a conflict occurs between international and munici-
pal law. The superficially applicable principle, formulated by the
World Court, is that a nation is estopped from pleading non-fulfill-
ment of international obligations, or a violation of a treaty, because
of its several organs or self-governing bodies under its control (for
example, states of the United States). But the term "incompe-
tent" strikes at the ability or authority of the contracting individu-
als to contract, not to fulfill their contracts.3
This article will not determine the basic problem so posed.
It will, however, present some constitutional clauses and doctrines,
and then provide a brief analysis of the manner in which the inter-
national relations of the United States may be subject to the limita-
tions and restrictions found in those clauses.
I. THE CONSTITUTION
A. The Constitution's Clauses
The Constitution of the United States is not a lengthy docu-
ment. It consists of seven articles and twenty-six amendments.4
The fifth and seventh articles are not of importance to the pres-
ent discussion.5 Of the other five articles, the first three respec-
3. The initial problem assumes the existence of a treaty, validly contracted,
and thereafter failing to be implemented because of a claimed constitutional (or
statutory) inability, whereas when the contracting individuals are "incompetent,"
the initial and continuing incapacity of one (or both) parties to the agreement
is in issue. The World Court, for example, found a contemplated customs union
between Germany and Austria to be incompatible with the latter's prior treaty ob-
ligations, and a dissenting judge in another case felt that an agreement was an
absolute nullity because its terms were contrary to public morality. See 1 G.
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (3d ed. 1957), giving principle, and
for these cases, see id. at 482, 486. See also text and note 95 infra.
4. There is also a Preamble which begins "We the People" but, according
to the Supreme Court, this portion of the Constitution is not a source of power
for the federal government. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
But see Forkosch, Does "Secure the Blessings of Liberty" Mandate Governmen-
tal Action?, 1970 LAW & SOCIAL ORDER 17, arguing the contrary as to that lan-
guage, and also Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
5. Article VII merely states that the Constitution is established when rati-
fied by nine states. U.S. CONST., art. VII. The term "states" is here used to
denote one or more of the fifty states which together form the United States of
America. (In international law the term is used for nations, but the restricted defi-
nition is adopted for our purposes unless the context discloses otherwise, as in a
quotation). See text accompanying note 42, infra.
Article V describes the amendment process: its requirements, procedures and
limitations. U.S. CONST., art. V. See Forkosch, The Alternative Amending
Clause in Article V: Reflections and Suggestions, 51 MINN. L, REv. 1053 (1967).
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tively create, empower, and limit a two-house Congress (the
House of Representatives and the Senate)," a President (and, in
effect, a presidential establishment),' and one Supreme Court
(with inferior courts, and a judicial system as may be created by
Congress).8 With these provisions a federal government' is
erected.' ° The fourth article sought to weld the earlier confed-
erated" states into a more perfect union by requiring them to give
full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial pro-
ceedings of their sister states; and to give citizens of one state trav-
eling into another state all the privileges and immunities the latter
gives its own citizens.12  The sixth article contains the famous su-
premacy clause.'3
In one aspect, this amending clause is of exceeding importance. It could, for ex-
ample, be used to grant powers which are (judicially) held not to exist (in the
international field), and, pari passu, it could be used to withdraw powers, perhaps
thereby nullifying a treaty or executive agreement already ratified or entered into,
or at the least compelling the Executive to withdraw therefrom. In this sense,
therefore, limitations on the federal powers in the international field indirectly
stem from the fifth article.
6. U.S. CONST., art. I.
7. Id., art. II.
8. Id., art. III.
9. It is sometimes overlooked that each of these three departments is a part
of the federal government, and that the federal government itself exercises all
three: the legislative, executive, and judicial powers. The "government," there-
fore, is this total body, and when speaking of one of the departments, care must
be taken that the meaning of the reference is clear. For example, the government
acts through Congress in enacting bills, through the President in signing or veto-
ing them, or through the Supreme Court in declaring them unconstitutional.
However, each such body lay, vis- -vis the other(s), individually engage in
internecine struggles.
10. Although it may be remarked that every one of the seven articles con-
tains the word "state", without the existence of such states there could technically
be no constitution, federal government, or concept or practice of federalism. See
U.S. CONST., art. I-VII.
11. The background of the states, from their colonial to Revolutionary War
experiences, need not be given. In 1777, the Articles of Confederation were pro-
posed, and ratified in 1781. The states lived under them for almost one decade,
until the Constitutional Convention of 1787 (in 1789 the new government took
office). [reproduced in U.S. SENATE MANUAL, S. Doc. No. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
595 (1973)]. During this period, the looseness of the confederation, the weak-
ness of the federal (national) government, and the political evils which resulted,
found states vying with each other economically and otherwise. In practical ef-
fect they remained sovereigns except that, in articles VI-IX, they surrendered vari-
ous (international) powers including the powers to send or receive embassies, to
enter into alliances and treaties with other nations, and to engage in war (except
when actually invaded). In general, these provisions were continued into the new
Constitution.
12. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2, ci. 1, amend. XIV, § 1.
13. Id., art. 6, cl. 2.
1975
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Strange though it may seem, those clauses in the articles
which bear, directly or indirectly, upon the federal government's
powers and limitations in the field of international relations are
not many. Their direct genesis was the Articles of Confedera-
tion14 in which the colonists' revulsion against the king and the
judiciary found expression in the power given to the Congress,
as the legislature, of almost complete authority in foreign relations
and affairs. This affirmative grant of such powers was continued
in the Constitution, together with the limitations placed upon the
states in that field.
The several clauses in the Constitution bearing upon inter-
national relations can be summarized as follows:
1. The power of impeachment is vested solely within
the Congress. The threat of use of this power may, perhaps,
influence or control the presidential exercise of power in the
area of international relations.'1
2. Control of the funds for international relations is
vested in Congress which enacts all revenue bills, which must
originate in the House of Representatives.' 6 Even though
the President may exercise a veto, revenue bills are subject
to re-passage by each legislative body by a two-thirds vote."'
3. Seventeen express powers of Congress are enumer-
ated in article 1, § 8,11 coupled with an additional power
conferred by the necessary and proper clause.19 These pow-
ers give the Congress a multiplicity and variety of muscle so
that it may, if it exercises these fully and completely, domi-
nate the federal establishment (in conjunction with other
powers given elsewhere). Included are the following rele-
vant items of congressional authority: to lay and collect
taxes;"0 to provide for the common defense and general wel-
fare; to borrow money;22 to regulate all interstate com-
merce, including foreign;23 to coin money and regulate its
14. See note II supra.
15. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 5, and art. II § 4.
16. id., art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
17. Id., art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
18. Id., art. I, § 8.
19. id., art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
20. Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
21. Id.
22. Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
23. Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Vol. 5
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value; 24 to establish post offices and roads; 25 to declare
war;26 to raise and provide for the armed forces and a militia
to quell domestic insurrections and repel invasions;- and,
"To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested . . in the Government ... , or in any De-
partment or Officer thereof. ' 28
4. Certain limitations on the federal and state govern-
ments are found next.29  Most notably, state governments
cannot "enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation;
grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal;"30 or "without the
Consent of the Congress3' . . .enter into any Agreement
or Compact . . .with a foreign Power. '3
2
5. The Executive power of the government of the
United States is vested in a President.3 3  He is commander
in chief of the armed forces.34 He is empowered: to exer-
cise the "Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators
present concur";3" to appoint ambassadors, consuls, judges of
the Supreme Court, and others with like advice and con-
sent;36 to receive ambassadors and other public ministers; 7
24. Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
25. Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 6.
26. id., art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
27. Id., art. I, § 8, cls. 12-16.
28. Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
29. For example, the federal government cannot grant any title of nobility.
Id., art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
30. Id., art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
31. Regarding this point see note 129, infra.
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. It should be noted that clause 1 refers
to an absolute prohibition concerning a "Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation,"
whereas clause 3 refers to a conditional one regarding "any Agreement or Com-
pact with another State, or with a Foreign Power .... ." Of these five terms,
therefore, only the last two are within the power of a state sans an amendment
to the Constitution. Even a treaty, as in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920), cannot fly in the face of such express prohibition. To this writer's knowl-
edge this consent has been exercised only for agreements or compacts with other
states and never with any foreign power. Quaere for practical purposes, does it
really exist in today's world? See also extended analysis in note 84, infra.
33. U.S. CONST., art. H, § 2, cl. 1.
34. Id., art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
35. Id., art. H, § 2, cl. 2.
36. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The exact language here is to nominate
"all other Officers of the United States whose appointments . .. shall be estab-
lished by Law . . ." Id., cl. 2. What of the power of removal? Since the Sen-
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to take "Care that the Laws be faithfully executed";38 to
swear to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution";39
and to commission all officers of the United States.40
6. The federal judicial power extends: to legal and
equitable cases and controversies arising under the federal
Constitution, laws and treaties; 4 to admirality and maritime
cases; and to all cases where "foreign States, Citizens or Sub-
jects" are involved. 42  In those cases and controversies af-
fecting the ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls,
or in which a state is a party, the Supreme Court of the
United States has original jurisdiction, while in all others it
has appellate jurisdiction as the Congress desires and deter-
mines.43
7. The states are federally guaranteed territorial inte-
grity," a republican form of government,4 5 and equal suf-
frage in the Senate.46
8. The Constitution, federal laws, and all treaties,
ate's concurrence is required for the appointment of these individuals, does this
extend to removal? This question arose in George Washington's first term, when
the executive departments were being organized and the House of Representatives
took up the establishment of a department of foreign affairs. This was later de-
nominated the department of state. Eventually one of the congressmen, when the
report of the committee of the whole house was taken up, moved twice to amend
a portion of the proposed bill; he was seconded by James Madison, and the
amendments were adopted and became law. Their effect was said to be "so as
clearly to imply the power of removal to be solely in the President.... ".J.
MARSHALL, IV THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 310 (1926).
37. No advice or consent is required for this purpose. U.S. CONST., art. II,
§ 3.
38. This directive and power is not limited to the enforcement of laws en-
acted by Congress, whether for domestic or foreign purposes, but comprehends
"the rights, duties and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our inter-
national relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of the government
under the Constitution .... ." In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890). The ques-
tion was put by the Court and not answered, and hence is obiter. It is not ex-
pressive of the law, as the President may not enforce a law entrusted for enforce-
ment to others; he needs statutory authority to act.
39. U.S. CONsT., art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
40. Id., art. II, § 3.
41. These include cases affecting ambassadors, consuls, and other public
ministers.
42. Id., art. III, § 2. See also note 5, supra.
43. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1, § 2, cl. 2.
44. Id., art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
45. Id., art. IV, § 3, cl. 3.
46. Id., art. V.
Vol. 5
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"shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . 41
In line with the preceding enumeration of the basic constitu-
tional provisons relevant to the vesting of power over international
relations, the amendments of the Constitution may be examined.
Of the total of twenty-six, the first eight (sometimes the first ten)
are referred to as the Bill of Rights. Ten of the following sixteen
deal merely with internal political functionings of the govern-
ment.48  Of the six remaining, four have to do with matters not
particularly relevant to international relations.4" Among the
amendments comprising the Bill of Rights, which constitute a
series of limitations on the federal government, 5° only a few may
be of significance in the area of international relations. 1 These
few provisions include the first, fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth
amendments. 52  Their relevancy to foreign affairs is determined
47. Id., art. VI, cl. 2. Prior to the ratification and adoption of the Federal
Constitution in 1789, the states retained the power of refusing to enforce, or even
repeal, treaties. The Constitution, while not increasing the substantive coverage
or scope, did improve the status of treaties by preventing the states from any
longer exercising such a power. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199
(1796). See also note 103, inf ra.
48. More specifically, the twelfth, part of the fourteenth, fifteenth, seven-
teenth, nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-second through the twenty-seventh
amendments, are concerned with internal domestic affairs; U.S. CONST., amend.
XII, XIV, XV, XVII, XIX, XX, XXII-XXVII.
49. Those four concern: limiting the judicial power in suits against the
states, giving Congress power to levy income tax, prohibition, and repealing pro-
hibition. Id., amend. XI, XVI, XVIII, XXI. The other two amendments respec-
tively: outlaw slavery or involuntary servitude within the United States "or any
place subject to their jurisdiction," Id., amend. XIII; and give the definition of
federal and state citizenship, with a series of limitations on the states, such as
that they cannot abridge the privileges and immunities of federal citizens, nor de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor to
deny to any person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, Id.,
amend. XIV, § 1.
50. Even though the first amendment opens with "Congress shall make no
law" etc., the judiciary has interpreted it to apply to the entire federal establish-
ment; so, too, with the entire Bill of Rights. See M. FORKOSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 325 (2d ed., 1969) [hereinafter cited as M. FORKOSCH].
51. For example, the seventh amendment guarantees rights to a jury trial in
suits at common law where the amount in controversy is over twenty dollars.
U.S. CONST., amend. VII.
52. Of these, the last four deal with procedures in criminal cases. id.,
amend. IV, V, VI, & VIII. The fifth amendment also contains a due process
clause practically identical with that appearing in the fourteenth amendment, and
a clause requiring just compensation to be given in exchange for private property
taken for public use pursuant to the power of eminent domain. Id., amend. V.
The first amendment contains the limiting substantive safeguards which, in
effect, give all persons the right to the free exercise of religion, to freedom of
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by the amount each amendment limits the power of the federal
government to conduct international affairs in a manner which im-
permissibly diminishes the fundamental individual rights respec-
tively protected by those amendments.
B. Constitutional Doctrines-The Separation of Powers
There are a few doctrines, political and judicial, which stem
from and are part of the lore behind the Constitution, and which
necessarily impinge upon this analysis. One already touched
upon is the concept of a limited national government (and limited
state government), restricted by amendments which protect cer-
tain basic rights of its citizens. "The United States is entirely a
creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no
other source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations
imposed by the Constitution . . . ."' Other doctrines may be re-
ferred to, including the system of checks and balances, which dis-
close that the Founding Fathers took to heart their experiences
as colonists, and sought to provide cross-checks by and on each
speech and of the press, and to the people the right peaceably to assemble and
petition the government. Id., amend. I.
By judicial interpretation, most of the clauses in the first, fourth, sixth and
eighth amendments have become limitations on the states by way of the fourteenth
amendment, the so-called incorporation doctrine. For extensive discussion and ci-
tation beyond the scope of this article see M. FORKOSCH, supra note 50, §§ 327-
46.
53. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957), per Black, J., for himself, Chief
Justice Warren, and Justices Douglas and Brennan. Only Justices Douglas and
Brennan remain today, 1975, on the bench. Of the other Justices, Whittaker
took no part in the consideration or decision; Justice Frankfurter concurred sep-
arately, but rejected an outmoded judicial view in the case of In re Ross, 140 U.S.
453 (1891), and felt that "Governmental action abroad is performed under both
the authority and restrictions of the Constitution .. . ;" id., at 56; Justice Harlan
also separately concurred in the result, and agreed with Justice Frankfurter's per-
tinent analysis, i.e., not to discard In re Ross entirely even though rejecting its
limitation of the Court to the mainland. Id., at 67. See also Kinsella v. Single-
ton, 361 U.S. 234, 252 (1960). Justices Clark and Burton dissented, the former
writing that "four of my brothers would specifically overrule and two would im-
pair the long-recognized vitality of an old and respected precedent . .." Id., at
78, 87. In his opinion Justice Clark did not treat the overseas applicability of
the Constitution. Thus six Justices did agree on the idea quoted in the text to
this note. In the light of the present composition of the Court, quaere: how valid
is this holding; how binding is the opinion? Insofar as this quotation is con-
cerned, it is suggested that it is good law, for Justice Stewart so agrees, Kinsella
v. Singleton, supra, at 261 (joining in Whittaker's concurring-dissenting opinion).
See also note 117, infra, and Justice Black's analogous language in Afroyim v.
Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967), a 5-4 decision in which the dissenters did not ex-
pressly reject such a view (J. Stewart and J. White in the dissent).
Vol. 5
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of the three branches of government. For example, the President
has a veto power over bills, although he may then be overriden; 4
the judiciary is subject to presidential appointment, with the Sen-
ate's concurrence;5 5 and within the Congress only the House may
propose revenue measures. " While the states are ordinarily
"impotent" for international affairs,5 7 the doctrines of dual sov-
ereignty and federalism may conceivably have important ramifica-
tions internally58 and externally.
59
The most important constitutional doctrine relevant to this
discussion is that of the separation of federal powers."" Limita-
tions of space permit only a brief observation. The concept,
which traces back to Aristotle, was familiar to the colonists not
only through the works of Locke and Montesquieu," but also
through the seventeenth century British experience when the
Kings, Lords, and Commons emerged as separate institutions. 2
For example, the Declaration of Independence castigated King
54. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 7, cl. 2.
55. Such concurrence must be displayed by two-thirds vote. Id., art. II, §
2, cl. 2.
56. Id., art. 1, § 1, cl. 1.
57. Of course exceptions may arise, as when actually invaded, a state could
immediately defend itself, or when an attack (by the Indians) was so "imminent
• .. as will not admit of delay." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Although see
notes 161 et seq., infra, where an assumed power, subject to congressional ap-
proval, impliedly exists.
58. See generally B. MARSHALL, FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1964) for
this area; in general, see also Creative Federalism, Hearings Before the Senate
Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I (1966), and
90th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 2-A and 2-B (1967), as well as the continuing analyses
in the area by the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress.
59. For example the United Nations is headquartered within the city and
state of New York, and questions of "protection" against picketers and others ex-
ercising first amendment rights sometimes create problems. Neither the Charter
of the United Nations, nor its Universal Declaration of Human Rights, may be
enforced sans congressional action; Fujii v. State, 28 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617
(1952); and see also notes 95 and 99 infra, as well as notes 129 et seq. infra
on other aspects of federalism having ramifications externally.
60. See M. FORKOSCH, supra note 50, at 156-68; Forkosch, The Separation
of Powers, 41 UNIV. OF COLORADO L. REV. 529 (1969) [hereinafter cited as For-
kosch, Separation]; see also generally the forthcoming book A. BESTOR, THE
POWER OF DETERMINING ON PEACE AND WAR: A HISTORICAL STUDY (Oxford U.
Press, 1975). For a contrasting study of the English system see, W. WYAr-r,
TURN AGAIN, WESTMINSTER (1974).
61. POLITICS 197-98 (B. Jowett, transl. 1943); J. LOCKE, AN ESSAY CON-
CERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1698);
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (T. Nugent, trans. 1900).
62. D. MINAR, IDEAS AND POLITICS: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 124
(1964).
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George because "He has made Judges dependent upon his Will
alone . . .0.3" The Massachusetts Constitution specified that
each of the three departments "shall never exercise" 64 the power
of the others, and at the Constitutional Convention these political
theories became constitutional reality.6" This reality arose not
from any express statement found in that document, but as an im-
plied doctrine through the opening few words in each of the first
,three articles,66 and followed ever since to the point where it has
become part of the judicial and political mores of the country.
One caveat must be mentioned with respect to the doctrine
of separation of powers. Application of the doctrine refers to a
refusal to permit, as James Madison put it in his exposition of the
Constitution, "the whole power of one department [to be] exer-
cised by the same hands which possess the whole power of an-
other department."67  The essential point is that there is not to
be a complete, total, entire merger of two (or three) of the pow-
ers in practice,' which is a far cry from denying each department
the ability to exercise some of the powers of the others. This
is exemplified through the doctrine of checks and balances where
each department does, at times, engage in another's functions.69
63. Reproduced in U.S. SENATE MANUAL, S. Doc. No. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
585, 587 (1973).
64. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXX.
65. See Forkosch, Separation, supra note 60, at 530-32 for references to the
Virginia proposals, Wilson's notes, and other comments; see also Bondy, The Sep-
aration of Governmental Powers in History, in Theory, and in the Constitution,
5 STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS, AND LAW, No. 14 (1896).
66. See U.S. CONST., art. I, II, III. The constitutional separation doctrine
therefore does not bind the states, nor does the fourteenth amendment's due proc-
ess clause require it. Dreyer v. Illinois, 197 U.S. 71 (1902).
67. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 314 (Mod. Lib. ed., undated) (A. Hamil-
ton); and see also No. 48. Madison also observed that it is "the accumulation
of all powers . . . in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many," which
is the evil, and that this "may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyr-
anny."
68. See the dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes (Justice Brandeis agreeing
with this conclusion, and Justice McReynolds agreeing in part) in Springer v.
Phillippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 211 (1928) for the correct view that "we do
not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action
with mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight compart-
ments. .. "
69. The purpose was "not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise
of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the
inevitable friction incident to the distribution of governmental powers among three
departments, to save the people from autocracy." Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Fundamentally, as the Massachusetts Constitution's language con-
cluded, the rationale behind the doctrine was "to the end it
may be a government of laws and not of men."7
In the field of foreign relations the separation doctrine has
been applied historically so "that the power to determine the
substantive content of American foreign policy is a divided pow-
er, with the lion's share falling usually to the President, though
by no means always."'71  For example, where the constitutional
powers of Congress over foreign commerce and those of the Presi-
dent over foreign relations are pooled "to the end that commer-
cial strategic and diplomatic interests of the country may be co-
ordinated and advanced without collision or deadlock between
agencies," then no review is available from "such provisions of
the order as resulted from Presidential direction .... *72
C. Judicial Review
It may be said, generally, that every country's statesmen and
political scientists know of the American doctrine of judicial re-
view, and know something of its application. In effect, this doc-
trine may result in judicial supremacy. Because of its repercus-
sions upon international relations, this overall limitation upon the
powers of both the President and the Congress should be under-
stood. In particular, and because of the separation doctrine, it
might be argued that all three co-equal departments could inter-
pret the written Constitution equally well. However, at an early
date Chief Justice Marshall resolved the insoluble riddle by arro-
gating to the juidiciary the power to review and declare unconsti-
tutional all legislative and executive acts and conduct.13  Although
And in the field of administrative law the legislative and executive depart-
ments may delegate "quasi-judicial" powers which permit their delegatees to exer-
cise, for practical purposes, all three powers. See M. FORKOSCH, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW passim (1956).
70. Forkosch, Separation, supra note 60, at 530. See also Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), and for more recent emphasis on
the doctrine, see New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); United
States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); and, on the Watergate question
on the construction to be given to "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" in the im-
peachment clause, see Forkosch, Impeachment-Review, 19 N.Y. L.F. 713 (1974).
71. E. CoawiN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POwERS 308 (3d ed. 1948)
(emphasis in original).
72. See Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,
333 U.S. 103, 110, 111 (1948), a 5-4 decision: the dissenters feeling that the
President is acting here as a delegatee.
73. According to Chief Justice Marshall:
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inveighed against by numerous individuals and officials, this judi-
cial power is too institutionalized today to be disregarded or over-
turned.
7 4
The federal judiciary thus exercises a superintending power
in the field of international relations and even international law,
7 '
mostly indirectly but sometimes directly. Even though the Su-
preme Court feels that the President's conduct in this area should
not be circumscribed (and sometimes, not even be inquired
into), it frequently rules on the constitutionality of his actions, and
those of Congress. One suggested limitation on this power of ju-
dicial review, which was significant in the post-civil War Recom-
struction Period can be applied in the area of international rela-
tions. Because of the unlimited7" power of Congress over the ap-
pellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it can ordinarily per-
mit77 or deny78 judicial review by that body.
If an act of the legislature [or executive branch], repugnant to the
constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the
courts and oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other words, though
it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if it was a law?
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137, 177 (1803).
74. The most recent illustration is, of course, the Supreme Court's review
of President Nixon's refusal to obey a lower court's directive to turn over tapes
and documents to a special federal prosecutor, which tapes thereafter led to his
undoing. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
75. The laws and decisions of the various states do not enter this area, and
all questions involving international law are to be resolved by federal law, regard-
less of the doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), and see also Hill, The Law-
Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 1024 (1967). For the post-Sabbatino situation see the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1965 § 301(d)(2), 79 Stat. 653, in 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2), upon which
the federal district court, on remand, gave judgment for the defendant. Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (D.C. N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 383 F.2d
166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
76. See note 78, infra, but cf. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
128 (1872), questioning such unlimited power as was there involved.
77. While the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court cannot be en-
larged or diminished, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803) its appel-
late jurisdiction has been statutorily or judicially altered. This is demonstrated
by the numerous decisions judicially preventing taxpayers and others with little,
if any, standing to sue. For an illustration of the Supreme Court's complicated
specialty see Chapman v. F.P.C., 345 U.S. 153 (1953). A Senate Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights of the Judiciary Committee in 1966 held extended hear-
ings on a proposed bill, S.2097, to provide for judicial review of the constitution-
ality of grants or loans under certain acts. These acts were related primarily to
the issue of church-state separation. Since then, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968) upheld a federal taxpayer's right to sue in this area under certain condi-
tions; see, on state suits, Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (per-
Vol. 5
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In the fllowing examination of powers and limitations in in-
ternational relations, this power of judicial review is nevertheless
seen to be itself limited by not only the judiciary's self-imposed
restrictions7" but also by Congress' (seldom asserted) power over
judicial appellate jurisdiction. 0 Throughout what follows, never-
theless, judicial decisions necessarily abound.
II. THE CONDUCT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The applicability of the preceding exploratory comments can
now be examined.8 ' While each department might be treated
separately, they cannot be so compartmentalized in practice; the
clauses, departments, and officials overlap and intertwine. In
large degree, as will be disclosed, there is a tripartite partnership
in this area, even though the President is ordinarily primus inter
pares. It seems to be somewhat generally accepted current think-
ing that constitutional history and clauses vest in the President vir-
tually plenary power in international relations. 82  Although bear-
mitting review for state taxpayers). In the field of international relations see also
note 75, supra.
78. In Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869), an appeal to the
Supreme Court from the lower court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus was
brought directly, a preliminary motion to dismiss the appeal was denied and the
Court asserted jurisdiction, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1868); thereafter oral argu-
ment on the merits was heard, including the constitutionality of the Reconstruc-
tion Acts, and the case was taken under advisement. While matters were in that
posture, Congress repealed much of the basic jurisdictional statute (vetoed by
President Johnson but repassed) that gave the Supreme Court appellate jurisdic-
tion in habeas corpus cases, whereupon the Justices then heard argument on the
effect of this new statute and accepted its constitutionality and scope. Thusly,
the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by McCardle because of a lack of appel-
late jurisdiction. See also Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869), distin-
guishing McCardle on the statutory facts but acknowledging its viability.
For other "controls" or "restrictions" on the power of Congress to declare
statutes unconstitutional, not further discussed here, see proposals to require more
than a scant majority so to do; enlarging the number on the bench when a Justice
reaches a retirement age and does not retire; compelling Justices to retire at 7.5;
and see Nagel, Court-Curbing Periods in American History, 18 VAND. L. REV.
925 (1965).
79. The doctrine of political questions is one judicially imposed restriction
which is covered infra note 149.
80. See the discussion of the McCardle case, note 78, supra.
81. It may be noted that of a budget of over 300 billion dollars for fiscal
year 1975, the total devoted to foreign relations, which includes not only foreign
aid but also military expenditures and defense, is well over half. See H. Doc.
No. 94-21, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
82. See, e.g., Goldwater, The President's Constitutional Primacy in Foreign
Relations and National Defense, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 463, 465-66 (1973).
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ing in mind Alexander Hamilton's questionable imprimatur,"s




The President is not only the chief executive and commander
in chief of the United States but, as expressly stated in the Consti-
83. He first propounded these views in his 1793 "Pacificus" essays, conced-
ing that he thereby contradicted his views of 1788 in THE FEDERALIST Nos. 69,
75, e.g., saying in the latter that "it would be utterly unsafe and improper to in-
trust" to a President "the entire power of making treaties" and therefore, pari
passu, executive agreements. THE FEDERALIST, No. 75 at 477 (B. Wright ed.
1961) (A. Hamilton). For a selection of the early text writers and their state-
ments agreeing with Hamilton's first views, see Bestor, Separation of Powers in
the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Original Intent of the Constitution Historic-
ally Examined, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 529, 581-84, n.190 (1974).
84. No effort is made here to define this term as used in international law.
See, e.g., discussion of art. 1 of the draft articles on the law of treaties adopted
by the International Law Commission at the eighteenth session, by the U.N. Con-
ference on the Law of Treaties, 1st Sess., Vienna, 26 March-24 May 1968, Official
Records, 11-20, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/ll, concerning inclusion of interna-
tional organizations with States as entities capable of entering into treaties. See
also [1968] 22 YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 843 (1971).
For the United States, the term may be contrasted with "agreement or com-
pact" as found in the Constitution. See also note 32, supra. As given in the
text of this paper, section I A. supra, article I, § 2, clause 2, empowers the Presi-
dent to make treaties, while article I, § 10, clauses 1 and 3, limit states from enter-
ing "into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation" or, "without the Consent of
Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with . . . a foreign Power
... The President is seemingly limited to "Treaties," if "Alliance, or Confed-
eration" are to be deemed somehow different, and similarly with respect to
"Agreement or Compact." U.S. CONST., art. I § 2. cl. 2, and § 10, cl. 1, 3. See
language, perhaps different, in Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893).
In effect this provides us with five different terms and, as next discussed, an
"Executive Agreement" must also enter the lists. This paper will not resolve
these domestic questions for the international scene, although see the discussion
by Chief Justice Taney in Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 570-72
(1840) (an extradition case from Vermont to Canada pursuant to treaty provi-
sions). Quaere: can the President be by-passed in the situation where a state
enters into a compact with a foreign power combined with a majority of Congress?
No presidential approval, as is ordinarily the case in the enactment of domestic
legislation, seems to be required for such congressional approval-does this now
permit a state to enter into an "international" agreement or compact without pres-
idential intrusion? See, e.g., the congressional implied approval sans presidential
signature (although referring to legislation seemingly giving this implied ap-
proval) when two states so agreed, as in Virginia v. Tennessee, supra, upholding
the implied consent. Thus, if an international agreement or compact is so en-
tered into (albeit this has never yet occurred), is it the supreme law of the land
under the supremacy clause of article VI? That clause refers to "Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States ....... U.S.
CoNST. art. VI, ch. 2. In other words, if not made under that "Authority," a
Vol. 5
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tution, "The [meaning "All"] executive Power shall be vested in
[him].' ' What meaning was envisaged by the Constitutional
Convention in the term "executive power" is ambiguous; what has
developed since then may be analogized to a political see-saw;
and what is encompassed or limited by the term is not only deter-
mined by judicial but also political interpretation."6 Not only are
powers and prerogatives found in the presidency and its office,
but also limitations, such as: re-passage of legislation over his
veto, overcoming him in his capacity as "the sole organ of the na-
tion in its external relations, and its sole representative with for-
eign nations. '8 7  This is, however, merely a judicial recognition
of a constitutional and practical fact of life, namely: that the
President is the single and most important authority in the United
States in the conduct of its foreign affairs. The nation is thus rec-
ognized and acts solely through the President in the field of for-
eign relations.88 For example, one Justice has opined that "he
so-called treaty is not the supreme law. See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416, 433 (1920). Is such a document "made" by or under the authority of the
United States only when made as per article II, § 2, clause 2? So that an agree-
ment or compact made under article I, § 10, clause 3, being made ("enter into")
between a state and a foreign power is not necessarily within articles II or VI,
and especially since article I requires only "the consent of Congress."
Regardless, how binding is such a compact on the entering state, the other
states, the foreign nation, the United States, the President, or the Congress? To
what extent would it be enforced by the Judiciary? These intriguing questions
are not here answered.
85. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1, cl. 1. The doctrine of separation of powers,
accompanying note 60, supra, permits replacing "The" by "All."
86. See, in general, C. THACH, THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY chaps. 3-
5 (1922); E. CORWIN, PRESIDENT, supra note 71, chap. I, and specifically 272-
74.
87. Former Chief Justice Marshall, quoted by Justice Sutherland in United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). The court felt
that in the field of foreign relations the President had inherent powers, and that
legislative delegations are judicially looked upon more favorably here than in the
domestic scene.
Curtiss-Wright has been defended and castigated. Factually, a Joint Resolu-
tion of Congress, approved May 28, 1934, was the authority for the President's
proclamation of the same day. Id. at 312-313. This proclamation was revoked
on November 14, 1935, by another presidential proclamation, id. at 313, and the
defense to the indictment contended, inter alia, that an unlawful delegation had
occurred. "Whether, if the Joint Resolution had related solely to internal affairs
it would be open to challenge that it constituted an unlawful delegation of legis-
lative power to the Executive," responded Justice Sutherland, "we find it unneces-
sary to determine. . ." Id. at 315. The reason was that the resolution fell "with-
in the category of foreign affairs . . ." Id. at 317. Justice Sutherland then went
into an "elucidation of. . . the differences between the powers of the federal gov-
ernment" externally and internally, and at page 319, set forth the President's posi-
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alone negotiates" treaties, 9 so that "[i]nto the field of negotiation
the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to in-
vade it." 0  So the President may or may not enter into negotia-
tions, break them off at any time, and even hold off and never
submit any documents to the Senate for its consent. In sum, there
can be no "congressional" or "senatorial" treaty without the Presi-.
dent, although the reverse is also true; nor can there be any presi-
dential treaty without at least two-thirds of the senators present
consenting.91 In constitutional theory, the Senate is supposed to
advise before it consents, but while George Washington's frus-
trated personal efforts toward this end have never been repeated,
this is not to say that, for example, Jefferson did not so act in
the Louisiana Purchase, or Tyler in the annexation of Texas.92
tion; in other words, all of this material was dicta. Professor Francis D. Wormuth
has remarked that this case "contains a famous though now rejected dictum that
the rule against the delegation of legislative power does not apply in foreign af-
fairs," Wormuth, The Nixon Theory of the War Power: A Critique, 60 CALIF. L.
R v. 623, 685 (1972); although see L. HENKIN, FORmN AFFAIRS AND THE CON-
sTrTUTION 23-4 (1972), who feels that while Justice Sutherland's history may be
incorrect, this "does not necessarily destroy his constitutional doctrine," and so,
Henkin feels, "his opinion . . . remains authoritative doctrine...." Id. at 25-6.
See also, in general, CORWIN, PESIDENT, supra note 71, at 216-24, for arguments
against the simplistic quotation in the text.
88. In practice, however, numerous Congressmen travel outside the country
and are received by heads of state. The extent and degree of their influence is
seldom a matter of record, but it is not conjecture that in 1974, United States
Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D. Mass.) should be welcomed in Moscow, and
United States Senator Henry M. Jackson (D. Wash.) in China, while they were
leading presidential candidates. There is, of course, an innocuous statute making.
it a federal crime for any citizen of the United States to carry on any correspon-
dence or intercourse with any foreign government "with intent to influence the
measures or conduct of any foreign government . . . in relation to any dispute
or controversies with the United States, or to defeat the measures of the United
States ...... 18 U.S.C. § 953, 62 Stat. 744 (1948).
89. This article will not discuss treaties or other relations with the Indian
tribes, on which see, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 595
(1823), and United States v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100, 103 (1855).
90. Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936); although see note 87, supra. The comment by Justice:
Sutherland that the President acts alone is incorrect. The Constitution gives him
power to "make" a treaty, but there is supposed to be Senatorial "advice" before-
hand, with "consent" at the end. For example, in the negotiation of the Jay
Treaty the Senate did enter initially to approve the ambassadors; thus the usurpa-
tion by the President, and the abdication by the Senate, does not alter the Consti-
tutional provision.
91. On other types of agreements, however, see text section II, infra, and
concerning laws, which may be enacted by a two-thirds vote of both Houses over-
riding a veto, see section I(A), supra.
92. For an extended version of the Washington episode see 1 G. HAYNES,
Vol. 5
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Once negotiations are concluded, the Constitution requires
submission to the Senate. At this juncture that body may do as
it pleases. For example, Congress may: (1) hold hearings (and
request officials to appear and provide information); (2) propose
amendments by a simple majority vote of those present; (3) make
its two-thirds consent of those present depend upon reservations
enacted (by a simple majority), as with President Wilson and the
League of Nations; (4) reject by a one-third plus one vote; or
(5) consent by a two-thirds vote of those present. After such
consent the President proceeds to effectuate the treaty.93 These
built-in constitutional and institutional procedures are sometimes
confusing to others, but they are limitations in the area of foreign
relations which other nations and diplomats must take into ac-
count. 4
Separate from these procedural limtations, which are not
overly-difficult to follow, are those now designated as substan-
tive. Even though a treaty may be negotiated, consented to,
signed and ratified by all concerned, is it nevertheless ineffective
or inoperable because of other constitutional limitations?9 5  For
example, as the supreme law of the land, a treaty ordinarily super-
sedes a state statute,98 but what of a federal law? The supremacy
THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 62-8 (1938), following closely the version
of Senator William Maclay. For a discussion of the Jefferson, Tyler, and other
items see Webb, Treaty-Making and the President's Obligation to Seek the Advice
and Consent of the Senate With Special Reference to the Vietnam Peace Negotia-
tions, 31 Omo ST. L.J. 490 (1970).
93. He issues a "Full Power" authorizing the signing, after such Senate ap-
proval, but suppose he has second thoughts and refuses to proceed-can he be judi-
cially compelled? The obvious answer is no, but impeachment may be the ulti-
mate answer, as analogically hinted in Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925).
94. For an interesting analysis of the treaty provisions by Alexander Hamil-
ton, who wrote sparsely on this subject, see his letter to William Smith, a congress-
man from South Carolina, on March 10, 1796, and that to Rufus King of March
16, 1796, 10 WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 147, 149 (H. Lodge ed. 1904)
Works 147, 149 (H. Lodge ed. 1904), in the latter giving thirteen "propositions
[which], in my opinion, amount to irresistible demonstration" of presidential com-
petence.
95. The self-executing and non-self executing treaties are not here involved.
These are ordinarily negotiated or judicially interpreted as such, and need not de-
tain us. See, e.g. Forkosch, Treaties and Executive Agreements, 32 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 201 (1954); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); and
Fujii v. California, 28 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952), as well as note 59, su-
pra, and note 100, infra. See also note 3, supra.
96. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796), reaffirmed in
Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1880); in both cases a Virginia confisca-
tory statute was held invalid where it denied an alien certain rights which a treaty
17
Forkosch: The United States Constitution and International Relations: Some
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1975
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JouRNAL
clause does not prefer one over the other, even though "Laws"
precedes "Treaties," and so the judiciary holds both to be of equal
weight; pari passu, where any conflict between the two occurs,
then the one more recent in time is to be preferred.17 But, with-
out detracting from this last statement, a curious anomaly may pre-
sent itself. The President-cum-Senate may propose, but the
House will financially dispose, as all revenue bills must originate
in the House;"s if the House rebels, there is nothing to be done
to compel an appropriation.9
Another question pertains to the limits of the federal power:
can the legislative periphery be extended by a treaty? Superfi-
cially yes, but this writer opines no, generally, and yes, particu-
larly. In 1913 Congress sought to regulate the killing of migra-
tory birds; two inferior federal courts held this unconstitutional;
in 1916 a treaty was entered into with Great Britain whereby the
United States and Canada agreed to protect such migratory birds
and to propose legislation therefor; in 1918 such a United States
law was enacted' 0 and the state of Missouri now sued to enjoin
guaranteed him; see also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434-35 (1920), where
other illustrations are given. See, further, note 47, supra, and United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-34 (1941); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S.
126 (1938), caution that "Even the language of a treaty wherever reasonably pos-
sible will be construed so as not to override state laws or to impair rights arising
under them .. " Id., at 143.
97. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), The Head
Money Cases, 112 U.S. 584, 599 (1884) (treaty superseded by later statute);
Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5
U.S. (1 Cr.) 103, 109 (1801) (treaty nullifies prior statute); see also Geofroy
v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890), and Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1957).
Of course such abrogation of a treaty does not necessarily relieve the government
of any international obligations incurred, but further discussion on this point is
not within the scope of this article.
98. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7, cl. 1, and discussion accompanying note 47, su-
pra.
99. See Wright, The United States and International Agreements, 38 AM.
J. INT'L L. 341 (1944).
100. In Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920), Justice Holmes stated
that "If the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute
under Article I, § 8 [clause 18], as necessary and proper means to execute the
powers of the Government...." If, however, a treaty's language unequivocally
(or by implication, judicially accepted as such) makes it self-executing (see notes
59 and 84, supra), then ordinarily no statute is required. Thereupon, the Presi-
dent, plus the minimum two-thirds of a quorum of the Senate (at the very least,
34), can ignore the House, the Supreme Court, and the people and, if the text
accompanying note 91, supra, is a correct statement, then such a minimum of 35
people (which includes the President) can constitutionally form a civilian junta
and run the country, all within and in accordance with the Constitution. Here,
Vol. 5
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a federal game warden from enforcing it because her reserved
powers, under the tenth amendment, were being infringed. Jus-
tice Holmes rejected this contention because "a national interest
of very nearly the first magnitude is involved. It can be protected
only by national action in concert with that of another power
.... 9101 In other words, it was something akin to a needed uni-
fomity of national, not local, action, as well as the exercise of
a form of the police power, 0 2 all of which compelled federal ac-
tion, and the economic justification somehow still rings true fifty-
of course, we may also quote Justice Holmes, in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208
(1927), that "[iut is the usual last resort of constitutional arguments to point out
shortcomings of this sort."
101. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), two Justices dissenting.
Holmes continued:
The subject-matter is only transitorily within the state, and has no per-
manent habitat therein. But for the treaty and the statute, there soon
might be no birds for any powers to deal with. We see nothing in the
Constitution that compels the government to sit by while a food supply
is cut off and the protectors of our forests and our crops are destroyed.
It is not sufficient to rely upon the states. The reliance is vain, and
were it otherwise, the question is whether the United States is forbidden
to act. We are of opinion that the treaty and statute must be upheld.
Id., at 435. See also E. CORWIN, THE DOCrRINE OF JuDicsAL REVIEW 170, n.22
(1914), wherein Professor Corwin incorrectly felt that such a treaty would be un-
constitutional because of the reserved powers of the state under the tenth amend-
ment.
102. For example, under the commerce clause (article I, § 8, clause 3) the
Congress has power where interstate commerce is involved. Such a power is
plenary, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), and may be used not
only for purposes of national regulation but also control. This is seen where the
states find it diffucult to act alone, or to prevent evils in the federal or state juris-
dictions. See extended discussions in M. FoRxoscH, supra note 50, chaps. 10 and
12.
In Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), Justice Holmes also remarked
that
It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the
national well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that
a treaty followed by such an act could, and it is not lightly to be assumed
that, in matters requiring national action, 'a power which must belong
to and somewhere reside in every civilized government' is not to be
found. Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 33 (1903). What was said
in that case with regard to the powers of the states applies with equal
force to the powers of the nation in cases where States individually are
incompetent to act.
Id., at 433.
It may be remarked that this method of analogical extrapolition is not neces-
sarily acceptable. For example, in Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419,
449 (1827), Chief Justice Marshall opined in that foreign commerce case that
"we suppose that the principles laid down in this case, to apply equally to impor-
tations [interstate commerce] from a sister state. .. ." The consequences of this
obiter's particular application were rejected in Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 123 (1869). So, it may be felt that Holmes' language is to be treated
as a casual remark or improper utilization.
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five years later. Numerous commentators have argued both sides
of the coin as follows: (1) that under the decision of Missouri
v. Holland, there is apparently no limit to the enhancing of the
legislature's substantive powers by complying with the formal or
procedural requirements of the treaty clause; 01 (2) that this de-
cision is to be limited strictly to its facts and holding; and (3)
even that the decision is a wishy-washy one permitting both of
these views to be held simultaneously. The author espouses the
second view, although leaning also to the first.
During the course of his opinion, Justice Holmes commented
that "[t]he treaty in question does not contravene any prohibitory
words to be found in the Constitution." 10 4  The central theme of
the opinion, therefore, is that an express constitutional limitation
cannot be overcome by a treaty, but leaves in abatement the ques-
tion of implied limitations. Justice Holmes continued: "[tihe only
question is whether it [the treaty] is forbidden by some invisible
radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment."' 5
Unable to find such a penumbral limitation, Justice Holmes an-
swered in the negative. 1" 6 Put differently, is the treaty-making
power free of limitations found in the Constitution or amend-
ments?
Accepting the inapplicability of the tenth amendment, would
it be proper to apply the first, fourth, fifth, sixth, etc.? One early
series of seemingly definitive answers began in 1891 and con-
tinued into the turn of the century. These cases held that trial
by jury (thus also the Bill of Rights) was not available to persons
residing outside the United States except in incorporated 0 7 terri-
tories. Excluded areas included consular courts in Japan, and the
103. See note 100; supra, and discussion in note 92, supra, especially with
respect to Holmes' comments on the validity of a treaty.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 433-34.
106. For the "penumbral" concept, as implied limitations with regard to the
rights of marital privacy emanating from the first amendment, see the minority
opinion of Justice Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
107. See Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1965) (holding Alaska
to have been so incorporated so that the sixth amendment could be used to de-
nounce a jury of six in a misdemeanor trial). See also, in general, Couder, The
Evolution of the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, 26 COLUM. L. REv. 823
(1926). In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), a jury of six for a state
criminal trial was upheld even though the sixth amendment applied via the four-
teenth amendment (see note 59, supra), and so current validity of the Rasmussen
case for this purpose is questionable, even though applied territorially.
Vol. 5
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unincorporated territory of Hawaii.' In a 1957 majority opinion,
concurred in by only three other Supreme Court Justices, Justice
Black properly rejected these cases and this approach, holding
now that provisions of the Constitution' 9 manifest "that constitu-
tional protections for the individual were designed to restrict the
United States Government when it acts outside of this country,
as well as here at home. . . ."110 Would the result vary if such
overseas acts and conduct of the government were based upon
written authority given to it by a treaty? In this 1957 case there
was an executive agreement, if not a treaty,
[Wihich permitted United States' military courts to exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed in Great Brit-
ain by American servicemen or their dependents. . . . [But]
no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the
Congress, or any other branch of Government, which is free
from the restraints of the Constitution.""
The reasons for these conclusions may be condensed into two,
namely: (1) "It would be completely anomalous to say that a
treaty need not comply with the Constitution when such an agree-
ment can be overridden by a statute that must conform to that
108. See, respectively, In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891), and Hawaii v. Man-
kichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); see also the Insular Cases, De Lima v. Bidwell, 182
U.S. 1 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Dorr v. United States,
195 U.S. 138 (1904).
109. See, particularly, article M § 2 and the fifth and sixth amendments, all
dealing with the right to a trial by jury in criminal matters. U.S. CONST., art.
I, § 2, and amend. 5, 6.
110. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 7 (1957), and see discussion on the viabil-
ity of this case in note 53, supra, especially the criticism by Justices Harlan and
Frankfurter in Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 252 (1960), although Justices
Whittaker and Stewart, quoted approvingly from it. Id. at 261.
Justice Black, in Reid v. Covert, supra, shortly again remarked that:
This Court and other federal courts have held or asserted that various
constitutional limitations apply to the Government when it acts outside
the continental United States ...
If our foreign commitments become of such a nature that the Govern-
ment can no longer satisfactorily operate within the bounds laid down
by the Constitution, that instrument can be amended by the method
which it prescribes.
Id. at 8, 14. Of course this language, the opinion, and the case should be read
in the light of the particular fact situation presented to the Court. This was a
narrow case of a citizen abroad with a trial before an American tribunal, whereas
we discuss a treaty between two or more nations and the effect thereof on the
Bill of Rights.
111. Id. at 15-16.
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instrument;" ' 1 2 and (2) the debates which accompanied the draft-
ing and ratification of the Constitution:
[M]ake it clear that the reason treaties were not limited to
those made in "pursuance" of the Constitution was so that
agreements made by the United States under the Articles of
Confederation, including the important peace treaties which
concluded the Revolutionary War, would remain in effect. It
would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those who
created the Constitution, as well as those who were respons-
ible for the Bill of Rights-let alone alien to our entire con-
stitutional history and tradition-to construe Article VI [the
supremacy clause] as permitting the United States to exercise
power under an international agreement without observing
constitutional prohibitions. In effect, such construction
would permit amendment of that document in a manner not
sanctioned by Article V [the amending article]. The pro-
hibitions of the Constitution were designed to apply to all
branches of the National Government and they cannot be
nullified by the Executive or by the Executive and the Senate
combined. 1 3
B. Executive Agreements
That a terminologically conceptual distinction exists between
treaties and agreements is undeniable.114 For example, the Con-
stitution speaks not only of treaties but also of agreements or com-
pacts; however, Article 102 of the Charter of the United Na-
tions 1 5 literally couples international treaties and international
112. Id. at 18.
113. Id. at 16-17. See also, Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890);
Bishop, Unconstitutional Treaties, 42 MINN. L. REV. 773 (1958). Some of these
express and absolute constitutional prohibitions are found in article I § 9, article
IV, § 3, clause 1, the Bill of Rights and other provisions. On self-executing trea-
ties, etc., see note 95, supra.
114. See, e.g., [1965] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 9-10, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/
Ser.A/1965/Add. (1965) on the terminology and the separate use, although it
seems to be suggested that agreements are virtually always included in the discus-
sions of treaties, an implication rejected by this writer. See also: A. McNAuI,
THE LAW OF THEATIEs chap. 1 (1961), who gives several distinctions, and varia-
tions, such as treaty, convention, declaration, agreement, memorandum of under-
standing; E. BYRD, TREATIES AND ExECUTIVE AGREEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
166-167 (1960), who speaks of an aide memoire, exchange of notes, protocols,
gentlemen's agreements, which "have often been realized under Presidential au-
thority alone...." Id. All digests, new or old, distinguish and discuss as a sep-
arate category such executive agreements. See for example G. HACKWORTH, DI-
GEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 390 et seq. (1943).
115. U.N. CHARTER, art. 102.
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agreements for the purpose of registration with and publication
by the Secretariat.116 A more important distinction is pragmatic,
and arises from the clash between the needs of the ongoing in-
dustrial-technological-military revolution and the legalistic heri-
tage of the past. This pragmatic distinction stems from the tradi-
tional view that treaties are akin to contracts" and are governed
by a single set of rules, regardless of their adequacy or inade-
quacy, although they have differing functions and legal character-
istics.118 For example, a commercial need may be contrasted
with an organizational (such as the United Nations), economic
(such as the European Economic Community), humanitarian
(such as United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administra-
tion)" 9 or military120 one. In each, different needs, requirements
and functions militate against the use of the treaty method' 2' at
least for the United States. 22
Whatever these distinguishing motivations were, they pro-
vided at least one rationale, and perhaps the impetus for the ex-
ecutive agreement. Over a recent twenty year period one survey
disclosed that while 291 treaties were concluded among the na-
116. Failure to register an agreement will prevent its invocation before any
United Nations organ. For the regulations of 1946 effectuating article 102, see
1 U.N.T.S. 20-31 (1946-47).
117. See, e.g., The Bello Corrunes, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 152, 171 (1821), al-
though conceptually rejected almost a century ago by S. AMos, POLrrcAL AND LE-
GAL REMEDIES FOR WAR 124-27 (1880).
118. See Jenks, State Succession in Respect of Law-Making Treaties, 29 Brr.
Y.B. INT'L L. 105, 106 (1952), referring to McNair's articles in 11 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 100-18 (1930).
119. 'T1he United States became a member . . . by executive agreement.
." Briggs, The UNRRA Agreement and Congress, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 650,
653 (1944).
120. See illustrations given by Baxter, Constitutional Forms and Some Prob-
lems of International Military Command, 29 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 325, 344, n.1
(1952).
121. See the armistices of 1900, Boxer Protocol, Sept. 7, 1901, T.S. No. 397,
1 Bevans 302, of 1918, with Austria-Hungary, Nov. 4, 1918, 2 Bevans 1 and the
1943 one with Italy, Armistice with Italy, Sept. 3, 1943, 61 Stat. 2740, T.I.A.S.
No. 1604 concluded by executive agreements, even though ordinarily accomplished
by treaties.
122. This view was rejected by McDougal and Lans, Treaties and Congres-
sional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of Na-
tional Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181 (1945), who conclude that:
[T]here are no significant criteria, under the Constitution of the United
States or in the diplomatic practice of this government . . . [between
treaties and agreements] other than the single criterion of the proce-
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tions of the world, their agreements totalled over 4,000, and their
exchange of notes over 2,800.123 In the first century and a half
of United States existence, nearly two thousand international in-
struments were entered into, of which only about eight hundred
were treaties.' The sad truth, therefore, is that the constitu-
tional powers of Congress are not greatly involved in the current
day-to-day details of international relations, save, possibly, for pro-
viding the legislative base (and limitations, if any); with a few
exceptions, albeit sometimes of major importance, most of the
business between the United States and the other nations seems
to be conducted via executive agreements and understandings.
As a result when a fait accompli was presented, Congress has,
into 1975, sought to limit or control the use of executive agree-
ments in a post-agreement syndrome (the War Powers Resolu-
tion). It may be opined, that even though the Senate and the
House together were able to assert a degree of authority in the
latter stages of the Vietnam war, and are (as of this writing) re-
luctant to permit the executive branch to negotiate and conduct
certain international affairs (such as the trade agreement with
Russia, and the Turkish-Greek Cypriote question) without some
legislative guidance or limitations, in the long run, this adjunct
effort to control even minimally the executive power in this area
will probably fail.
What is meant by an executive agreement? The Interna-
tional Law Commission, in its 1962 Draft Articles on the Law of
Treaties, defined a:
"Treaty in simplified form" . . . [to mean one] concluded by
exchange of notes, exchange of letters, agreed minute, mem-
orandum of agreement, joint declaration or other instrument
concluded by any similar procedure.
In concluding such [executive] agreements, the executive
branch of [any] government feels that it has the requisite au-
thority ipso jure to bind the government in matters in which
it alone is competent to act. .... 125
123. Hamzen, Agreements in Simplified Form-Modern Perspective, 43 BRrr.
Y.B. INr'L L. 179, 182-83 (1970).
124. See table in Wright, The United States and International Agreements,
28 AM. J. IN'r'L L. 341, 345 (1944), who also raises and disposes of various argu-
ments against the validity of executive agreements.
125. Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, [1962] 2 Y. B.
IN'eL LAW COMM'N 157, 161, 163 U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SER. A/1962/Add.l.
Vol. 5
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But this statement, while applicable generally for many nations
of the world, had first to run the gauntlet of historical use and
recent opposition 126 in the United States,127 before making itself
politically, and then judicially, acceptable. A brief discussion of
the basic types of executive agreements available to the President,
with limitations on each method, will highlight their use and con-
stitutional parameters.
We may broadly classify the tools used to create United
States-foreign relationships as: (1) treaties; (2) agreements by
the President acting with congressional assent before conclusion
(such as by a delegation) 2 ' or after (by ratification);' 2 9 (3)
Practically all States conclude nowadays a growing number of agree-
ments in simplified form, namely without observing the formal require-
ments of their constitutions for the conclusion of treaties in due and
proper form. Nevertheless, these agreements are akin to the most sol-
emn treaties as to their content, and they embrace a wide variety of sub-
jects, touching upon vital interests of the contracting parties.
Id. at 182. See also [1965] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 12-13, U.N. Doc. A/CN./
4/Ser. A/1965/Add. for a discussion of "Treaty in simplified form."
Analogically, we may refer to the procedures for chartering a corporation:
that is, if all goes well and all statutory conditions are complied with, a de jure
corporation is formed, whereas if any material condition is omitted, but not suffi-
cient to deny any validity to the corporation, then a de facto corporation emerges.
So, here, what the simplified treaty, or treaty in simplified form, refers to, is in
effect a de facto treaty. However, for the United States, there is a distinction:
the executive agreement stands on its own footing and need not rely on the treaty
power. Thus the executive agreement exists either in a de jure status or not at
all, and will not take on a de facto nature, save, of course, as the parties may
voluntarily adhere to their arrangements.
126. See, the proposed Bricker Amendment of 1952(3) to the Constitution,
an effort to prevent a situation such as Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920),
discussed in the text and notes 100-102, supra; see also Forkosch, Treaties and
Executive Agreements, 32 CHi.-KENT. L. REV. 201, 217 (1954) [hereinafter cited
as Forkosch, Treaties].
127. See, e.g., Wright, United States, supra note 99, at 341, referring to Jeffer-
son and Madison, as well as Senator J. William Fulbright's 1943 statement.
128. See, Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1891), where the 1890 statute, 26
Stat. 567, authorized, and the Court upheld the power of, the President to suspend
the free importation of designated items, and presidential (verbal) agreements
with foreign nations were also upheld whereby reciprocal suspension of free im-
ports would be lifted, the judicial reasoning being based upon a legislative contin-
gent delegation of power. See also Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583
(1912), a legislative authorization, resulting in commercial agreements, was indi-
rectly upheld in permitting "not a treaty . . . [but] an international compact."
See also Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928), on which
see further W. MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 175 (1941).
Reference may also be made to the spectacular Lend-Lease Act of 1941, on
which see Forkosch, Treaties, supra note 126, at 217. Such a method of Ameri-
can participation in international affairs, even though humanitarian (see note 119,
supra), or to promote United States national security, illustrates a situation where
1975
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agreements by the President acting solely within the capacity of
the office,3 0 either through powers claimed, such as those of the
commander in chief, or as the primary-sole national organ in for-
eign relations; (4) agreements by the President acting in some-
what of a dual capacity, that is, as a delegatee and as President;131
(5) agreements by the President acting in the absence of congres-
sional legislation;' 32 and (6) possible state-foreign agreements or
compacts.' 3
Of present interest is the fifth category, where the President
maneuvers in the absence of congressional legislation. An illus-
tration of questionable use of such presidential power occurred
during the administration of Ulysses S. Grant, when a request was
bargaining and log-rolling are required. This political give and take in the area
of foreign affairs is necessary, since treaties cannot do this on instant ad hoc
bases. The influence exerted by the granting country on and in the domestic af-
fairs of the recipients is also a factor in many respects. See Alpert and Bernstein,
International Bargaining and Political Coalitions: U.S. Foreign Aid and China's
Admission to the U.N., 27 W. POL. Q. 314 (1974). The contemporary scene is,
of course, dominated by the American aid given to South Vietnam, not here dis-
cussed.
129. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228 (1941), that Congress, af-
ter the Litvinov Assignment (see text and notes 139 et seq., infra), "authorized
the appointment of a Commissioner to determine the claims of American nation-
als against the Soviet Government...." See also Wright, United States, supra
note 99, at 342, n.4.2, who feels that there can be no congressional delegation
to the President in the making of international agreements because Congress lacks
such power of negotiating and making, but it may provide (give assurances) for
the execution of any such agreement after it is made, and later quotes a Congress-
man that "When the consent of Congress is required to authorize a State to enter
into an agreement or compact with a foreign state, it presupposes the existence
of a power in Congress to do it." Id. at 228.
130. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), apparently the first such
decision, and see text and note 136, infra, and note 114, supra, as well as W.
MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL ExEcUTrIVE AGREEMENTS (1941), and S. CRANDALL,
TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 86 (1904).
131. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), and dis-
cussion note 87, supra, and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952), where intimations in this area seemingly uphold such a presidential
power, although as to the former (and the Russian bank cases, infra notes 140-
43, and text accompanying), see the trenchant criticism by Prof. Borchard, Shall
the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 637, 641-43
(1944). In the Steel Seizure case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the
concurring opinion by Justice Jackson, stated that "Presidential powers are not
fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of
Congress...." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra at 635-38. See
the next text paragraph, sentence 2, for an elaboration upon the Justice's next
comments. See also text paragraph and note 138, infra.
132. See text and note 136, infra.
133. See text and note 32, supra.
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made by a French company to lay a submarine cable between that
country and the United States. Because of a proposed monopoly
feature, the President refused permission until the exclusive priv-
ilege was renounced. The question, however, remains as to the
existence of a proper basis for such conduct and arrangement. In
his annual message of 1875 to the Congress, President Grant re-
ferred to "the absence of legislation by Congress, [so that] I was
unwilling" '134 to grant permission. The constitutional rationale, as
explained in 1898 in a memorandum by the Acting Attorney-
General to the Secretary of State, was that the President "rested
his authority . . . upon his power to prevent its [the cable's] land-
ing altogether . . . ."1 But that official's conclusion did not go
so far, and in effect agreed with the President: "I am of the opin-
ion, therefore, that the President has the power, in the absence
of legislative enactment, to control the landing of foreign sub-
marine cables . . ,.". In other words, an analogy may be
made to the concurrent power over certain types of interstate com-
merce. The States may act and regulate so long as and until the
national government has not legislated thereon and thereby pre-
empted the field. In this interstate commerce area, it is the Con-
gress which has the ultimate power, and is thereby able to deny
or permit the Executive to exercise such power so long as Con-
gress wills. 137  However, the interstate commerce rationale is not
here applicable, and is therefore rejected in the foreign commerce
134. 2 J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 454 (1906).
135. Id. at 456.
136. Id. at 463. The memorandum from which these quotations appear are
set out in full. See also, United States v. La Compagnie Francaise des Cables
Telegraphiques, 77 F. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1896), stating, as obiter, the view that the
consent of the
[G]eneral government [to the laying of cable] may be implied as well
as expressed . . . which, in the absence of congressional action, would
seem to fall within the province of the executive to decide.
Id. at 496. By statute in 1921, 42 Stat. 8, 47 U.S.C. § 34-35, Congress empow-
ered the President to grant "a written license to land or operate such [a] cable
. .. On the conduct of President Theodore Roosevelt with respect to the
Santo Domingo treaty-executive agreement incident, see his autobiography T.
ROOSEVELT, AN AuTOBIOGRAPHY 510-11 (1913, 1927 ed.), wherein after the Sen-
ate had rejected a treaty the President, in 1905, accomplished the same ends by
executive agreement.
137. See, on all this under the concept of the preemption doctrine, M. FORK-
OSCH, supra, note 50, §§ 236-42. In effect, therefore, the President may also be
said to be acting as a delegatee of the Congress and thus falls in the fourth such
grouping given above, text and note 131, supra. See also MOORE, DIGEST, supra
note 134, at 466-80, giving numerous illustrations of "International Cooperation"
which encompass aspects of several of the groups.
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area, as there exists a plenary congressional power to act in this
field of foreign commerce.
138
The third category is also of major interest; that is, where
the President acts as such and without consulting any delegation
from the Congress or where Congress acquiesces in his conduct
(nay, even when they are in opposition to him), so that his pow-
ers derive solely from the Constitution. Generally, in this situa-
tion, a subsidiary series of questions intrudes, namely: is he act-
ing because Congress has no power over the subject; is there a
concurrent power able to be exercised by either or in conjunction;
does presidential exercise disable congressional ability; is it presi-
dential exercise minus whatever congressional power exists? Ob-
viously the answers here will condition, if not determine, judicial
response to the problem(s), if any, found in this third category.
Regardless, it may be assumed that an executive contention of
power will be asserted in the area, despite any legislative ability,
and executive conduct will result from the claim of such presi-
dential authority.
139
The series of Russian bank cases is, perhaps, the best illus-
138. A 1921 decision by Augustus N. Hand involved a contract between a
British corporation and an American one, whereby the latter agreed to lay a cable
between Barbados and Miami Beach, to be connected with a cable to be laid by
the former from Brazil to the Barbados; when the American corporation was
about to land its cable at Miami Beach the President forbade it. The American
corporation thereupon proposed to splice this cable into one of three others it had
laid between Key West and Cuba (two laid without permit, and one with a permit
from the Secretary of War, with this latter permit having been revoked by the
President), whereupon the United States sought an injunction against landing the
proposed cable and preventing messages over the other one. In denying the in-
junction the Judge stated, inter alia, that
There is no doubt that Congress, by virtue of its authority to regulate
foreign commerce, could regulate the laying and operation of cables, and
has often done this. I cannot regard a failure by Congress to exercise
its undoubted powers as proof that some other branch of the government
has the right to do what Congress might readily have authorized.
United States v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 272 F. 311, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
The Second Circuit affirmed, 272 F. 893 (2d Cir. 1921), its per curiam opinion
following the views of Judge Hand, although in the Supreme Court, pursuant to
stipulation between the parties, there was a reversal and remand but "with direc-
tions to enter a decree dismissing the bill without prejudice.... .260 U.S. 754
(1922).
139. See Forkosch, Treaties, supra note 95, wherein I wrote:
These "executive" agreements, based on the first of the above men-
tioned sources, as distinguished from the "legislative" [delegated] execu-
tive agreements of the second type, have been used by McKinley, Theo-
dore Roosevelt, Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt.
Id. at 214-15. For earlier illustrations, see E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE
AND POWERS 259-65 (2d ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as E. CORWIN].
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tration of judicial acquiescence in a civil exercise of such execu-
tive powers. When Franklin D. Roosevelt became President one
of his first acts was to effect an exchange of diplomatic correspon-
dence with the Soviet Government so as to bring about a final
settlement of the claims and counterclaims between the two na-
tions. As part of the settlement the Soviet Government assigned
(through the Litvinov Assignment) to the United States money
on deposit with Belmont, a private banker in New York. The
money had duly become the United States Government's prop-
erty under its internal law. Coincident with the assignment "the
President recognized the Soviet Government, and normal diplo-
matic relations were established .... "I'll A majority of the Su-
preme Court upheld the power of President Roosevelt so to act,
and permitted the United States to obtain the moneys saying, inter
alia, that "in respect of what was done here, the Executive had
authority to speak as the sole organ of that [United States] gov-
ernment .. ."141
A year later the same agreement was examined to ascertain
whether it, expressly or impliedly, overrode a state statute of limi-
tations; the Court negatived this, and said that whether such an
overriding clause would have been valid if present was not re-
quired to be answered.14 But three years afterward the overall
area of executive agreements was explored again, and again was
upheld in toto---at least "to determine the public policy of the
United States with respect to the Russian nationalization decrees.
. . .,"143 Justice Douglas"" referred inter alia, to a treaty as be-
ing the "Law of the Land" under the supremacy clause,"' 45 and
then commented that "[s]uch international compacts and agree-
ments as the Litvinov Assignment have a similar dignity ....
140. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 325, 330 (1937).
141. Id. at 330, also saying: "There are many such [executive] compacts,
of which a protocol, a modus vivendi, a postal convention, and agreements like
that now under consideration are illustrations...." However, it should be noted
that in support of its statement the court relied upon Altman & Co. v. United
States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912) which involved a legislative authorization.
142. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 136 (1938).
143. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1941).
144. Writing for himself and three others, with Justice Frankfurter concurring
"to add a few observations," id. at 234, with two Justices not participating and
two dissenting. The dissenters, inter alia, referred to "confiscatory decrees," id.
at 246-47 and urged full faith and credit as well as due process considerations.
145. Id. at 230.
146. Id. See, however, E. BYRD, JR., TREATIES AND ExacuTvE AGREEMENTS
IN THE UNITED STATES 120-31 (1960), who distinguished "similar" from "equal"
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The Russian bank cases do not, of course, either exhaust the
possibilities of the types of executive agreements or conduct, or
disclose -their outer limits. 147 For example, the President may not
have power as such, on the domestic scene during peace, to order
the seizure of private property alleged to be required to aid a "po-
lice action" (such as the Korean War) undertaken abroad under
the aegis of the United Nations and approved by the Congress,
especially where the Congress has statutorily provided for a proce-
dure to be followed; 4 " he nevertheless may, it is contended, have
an inherent, or residual, or commander in chief, or executive
power able to be utilized externally under certain conditions and
requirements-although no exact judicial authority is found in
support.
The nub of this ability and the inherent limitations, lies in
the question of when and under what circumstances he may act,
the kind and type and scope of such action, and the limitations
otherwise imposed upon him. Eventually, 'these questions may
149
become judicially cognizable, 50  so that a few illustrations
may clarify the problem. For example, in 1902 five justices
pointed to the lack of authorizing legislation for a series of agree-
ments with Mexico between 1882 and 1896, whereby each coun-
try could pursue marauders across 'the border; they felt, however,
that insofar as permitting foreign troops into the country for
purpose of parading was involved, such a power "was probably
assumed to exist from the authority of the President as com-
so as to highlight the differences in the testing of treaties and agreements to deter-
mine their validity; once held valid, however, then the executive agreement "has
equal supremacy with a treaty ....
147. See, note 174, infra. Also of interest are executive agreements requiring
congressional funding for implementation (for example, the Vietnam situation),
and those problems involving totalitarian nations. Representatives from these na-
tions may, if they so desire, enter into binding commitments without the necessity
of returning to their countries for confirmation and ratification of their actions,
and, in addition, they can point to a continuity of policy which elected officials
cannot have.
148. The Steel Seizure Case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952). Quaere: In this domestic, peacetime situation, these Congres-
sional procedures were held binding, and therefore limitations, on the President;
but what of a foreign, nonpeacetime situation? See text and note 192, inf ra.
149. For example, the Court may feel that a "political question" is involved
and refuse to intrude, on which see discussion in Wormuth, Nixon Theory, note
87, supra at 678-88; see also notes 177 and 213, infra.
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mander-in-chief."'' In 1917 President Woodrow Wilson unilater-
ally ordered armed guards to be placed on merchant vessels even
though the Congress had refused to authorize it.'"2 Also, Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt's conduct belied his obeisance to the
constitutional power of Congress to declare war, for his pre-World
War II unauthorized agreements presented fait accomplis, which
precipitated the United States into that conflagration.'
C. The Precipitation, Declaration, and Conduct of War.
The war powers of the President are seemingly found in but
one short portion of article II § 2, clause 1, consisting of sixteen
words 54 which make him the commander-in-chief of the armed
forces. The war powers of Congress, however, embrace at least
six expressly-stated clauses in article I, § 8, as well as others such
as the necessary and proper clause.' 55 Under these powers Con-
gress may make rules and regulations to govern the armed forces
which are binding upon the President.' 56 However, the President
151. Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 435 (1902), and see also dissent
id. at 467; the minority of four justices felt such presidential exertion of power
required an express treaty or statute as a base.
152. See, for one questionable basis, Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 170,
177 (1804), where a question is posed in a negative fashion; the case is no author-
ity for Wilson's act, or threat so to act.
153. See, for a listing of dates and acts, E. CORWIN, supra note 139, at 246-
48. Prof. Corwin refers to the agreement of July 7, 1941, 55 Stat. 1547, E.A.S.
No. 232, with Iceland taking over from Great Britain the defense of that island,
and the Atlantic Charter agreement with Winston Churchill. Atlantic Charter,
Aug. 14, 1941, 55 Stat. 1603, E.A.S. No. 236. See also Forkosch, Treaties, supra
note 126, at 215-16, for reference to
[T]he 1940 series of executive agreements with Canada and Great Brit-
tain, following on the collpase of France, which established a Permanent
Joint Board on Defense and led, under statutory authority, to the ex-
changing of fifty overage destroyers for a 99-year lease on British naval
bases. . . . Even better known . . . are those [executive agreements]
made at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam.
Hull-Lothian Agreement, Sept. 2, 1940, 54 Stat. 2405, E.A.S. No. 181, 203,
L.N.T.S. 201; 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 484 (1940). To what extent this 50-destroyer
exchange could be effectuated today is conjectural, although, perhaps, loans might
be available as, for example are provided for in 50 U.S.C. § 1876 et seq., being
specific authorizations and general sections, including inter alia, sections such as
§ 1878h requiring the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, to make a determination that the transfers are in the best interests
of the United States, and sections with extension and also termination dates.
154. An additional eighteen words give him command of the state militias
"when called into the actual Service of the United States," which probably would
follow automatically even if not so literally expressed, U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2,
cl. 1.
155. Id., art. I, 8, cl. 18. See section I(B) of this article, supra, although
even here much more could be said.
156. Swai v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897). These rules and regulations
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may also call into play other powers given to him, such as the lan-
guage in his oath of office, to preserve, protect, and defend the
Constituion, as well as the directive to him to "take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.' 5 7  Abraham Lincoln's union
of this last provision with his commander status justified, at least
in his eyes, the series of "war" measures ihe ordered when Fort
Sumter fell in 1861 and before Congress could assemble ten
weeks later to ratify and continue these and other actions.158
Whether because of such later congressional support, or because
while "a civil war is never publicly proclaimed, eo nomine against
insurgents, its actual existence is a fact in our domestic history
which the Court is bound to notice and to know,"' 59 the Supreme
Court upheld these Lincolnian exercises (usurpations) of pow-
ers.
Upholding the President's powers unilaterally to suppress an
internal insurrection differs, however, from sustaining 'his powers
unilaterally to quell or precipitate an external "war."' 60  There
is no question that Congress has the sole power to declare war,'61
are also termed military law, and the armed forces proceed under these articles
of war. Besides these
mhe military has, again by necessity, developed laws and traditions of
its own .... Just as military society has been a society apart from
civilian society, so "[m]ilitary law .... is a jurisprudence which exists
separate and apart from the [civilian] law which governs in our federal
judicial establishment."
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), and see also notes 154-55, supra,
and 178 and 181, infra. See also the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, 20
Stat. 152, 18 U.S.C. § 1385, making it unlawful to use the Army or the Air Force
as such "except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Con-
stitution or Act of Congress .. "
157. U.S. CONST., art. HI, § 3.
158. See J. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 49-50,
121, 149-150, 243-44 (rev. ed. 1951).
159. The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 667
(1863): although four Justices dissented, feeling that a declaration of war was
necessary before the imposition of a blockade, and that only after Congress so
acted on July 13, 1861, was there a legal beginning of war; see also note 148
supra. This general problem was early discussed by C. VAN BYNKERSHOEK, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WAR chap. II (P. Du Ponceau, trans]. 1810), who also
gave several references and, at one point declared: "Here then is a remarkable
instance of a war carried on for a great length of time without ever having been
declared ...... Id. at 14.
160. "Paradoxical as it may seem, the fundamental conceptions of interna-
tional law can best be understood if it is assumed that they maintain and support
the rule of force .... ." G. KEETON AND G. SCHWARZENBERGER, MAKING INTER-
NATIONAL LAW WORK 32 (2d ed. 1946).
161. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. Dean Pound has written that "'War'
in international law does not necessarily mean the same as 'war' in the sense of
Vol. 5
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but it is also conceded that it is the President who thereafter has
the sole power to conduct it as such. 162  Even though there may
be no such declaration, when another nation attacks or invades,
then factually16 3 the United States is at war and the President's
war powers attach.164  Regardless, is such a power, however in-
augurated, an unlimited one? Obviously not, for Congress, not
Article 1, Section 8, paragraph 11 of the Constitution of the United States ...
[]ho can enforce against the executive a constitutional provision that only the
legislative department can declare war? .... ." Foreword to F. GROB, ThE REL-
ATIVrrY OF WAR AND PEACE iX-X (1949). We may, perhaps, sarcastically para-
phrase, war is war is war is ....
162. Id.; U.S. CoNST., art. II, § 2, cl. 1. See also Alexander Hamilton's com-
ments on such restricted powers of the President, comparing them to the greater
powers of the English King, in THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (A. Hamilton).
163. See concurring opinion by Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952): "Of course, a state of war may in fact exist
without a formal declaration...." Id. at 642. See also Dole v. Merchants'Mu-
tual Marine Ins. Co., 51 Me. 465, 470 (1863).
164. The United States may also be at war when another nation attacks, as
was the case on December 7, 1941, when the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
precipitated the United States into war without an act of Congress, or when an-
other nation declares war against the United States, as when Germany, four days
later, did so. In both cases Congress reacted shortly thereafter by declarations
of war, even though, constitutionally, these might be unnecessary. For stand-by
legislation, however, and for emergency powers, such congressional declarations
would be deemed necessary. See The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67
U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668, 691 (1863), although here an act of Congress of 1795
had seemingly already supplied authorization, although the four dissenters dis-
agreed. See note 167, infra. The language of the Court seemingly was limited
to a "case of invasion by foreign nations [e.g. Japan, but what of Germany?],
and to suppress insurrection .... ." The Prize Cases, supra, at 668. Where the
country is at war, regardless of how or why, the President is authorized and re-
quired to meet "force by force." Id. at 670. See also President Tyler's action
in 1844 in rushing to mobilize troops so as to "protect" Texas (from Mexico)
because of the pending treaty of annexation, informing the Senate that even
though that body had not yet consented, still a "title" had been acquired which
would justify employment of force "to drive back the invasion," (although he un-
dertook no act of war). Quoted in Corwin, President, supra note 139, at 245.
See also P. JESsup, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONs 163 (1952).
We may note peripherally that in other areas the question of war or non-
war (not necessarily peace) may be decided on different policy reasons. For ex-
ample, insurance policies may have an exclusion of coverage (or other like clause)
in the event of war; a declared war without a later declaration of peace does not
make such exclusionary clause effective during factual peace, Bergera v. Ideal Na-
tional Life Ins. Corp., 524 P.2d 599 (1974), although a combat soldier's
death in Korea was held to be during a war although never so declared,
Langlas v. Iowa Life Ins. Co., 245 Iowa 713, 63 N.W.2d 855 (1954), Zaccardo
v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 20 Conn. 76, 124 A.2d 926 (1956); Weiss-
man v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 112 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Calif. 1953). See
generally, Comment, Acts of Terrorism and Combat by Irregular Forces: An In-
surance "War Risk"? 4 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 315 (1973-74).
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the President, has the express power to raise and support the
-armed forces, etc. 65 However, both departments may neverthe-
less engage in "a situation in which there has been joint action
by the President and Congress, even if the joint action has not
,taken the form of a declaration of war."' 66
War is, of course, an emergency of such national and total
magnitude that its existence is self-evident. While all declared
or defensive wars against invasion' 67 therefore precipitate emer-
gencies, the converse is not always true; at least for legal and con-
stitutional purposes, not all emergencies include wars. Here, of
course, we assume the war-peace definitional dichotomy which
pervades international law, from its ancient to its classical writ-
ers. 165 But modem conditions do not lend themselves to such a
simplistic enunciation; for example, is the "cold war" of the past
thirty years compatible with the classical shooting war? Or is
there an intermediate status between 'and war and peace which
should be recognized?' 69 If so, what are, for us, the respective
165. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cls. 12-16, and see text and notes 1 et seq.,
supra, although quaere: the United States is actually and actively at war, and
Congress refuses to raise funds; has the President the constitutional powers to be-
come not only a Cincinnatus but also an Alexander, an Attila, or a Hitler? Ob-
viously not, but will he nevertheless exercise the powers? Obviously a strong and
determined President will do so; as for others, the question is, of course, hypothet-
ical and need not be pursued further. We may analogize to the Revolutionary
years when an impotent Congress, without an appointed or elected President,
could do little, although now, vis-h-vis a President, it is a recalcitrant body.
166. United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511 (D.C. Mass. 1968).
167. Although see note 200, infra, for an alleged justification of such a "de-
fensive" war. Illustrations of Hitler's like claims, and later those of Stalin, need
not be given. See also Von Elbe, The Evolution of the Concept of Just War in
International Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 665 (1939).
168. See, 2 Q. WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 698 (1942), who examines the
subject in great detail but eventually defines war as, at least in part, including
a "conflict of armed forces. ... "
169. For a negative response see Ronan, English and American Courts and
the Definition of War, 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 642, 643 (1937), and see further Eagle-
ton, The Form and Function of the Declaration of War, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 19
(1938). On the other hand, the Korean "police incident" was, apparently and
technically, a United Nations project; although the Charter provides for military
action after agreements are made, and since these never materialized there was
a violation of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, 22 U.S.C. § 287(d);
but what of Vietnam? See also Jessup, Should International Law Recognize an
Intermediate Status Between Peace and War?, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 98 (1954). Ac-
cording to von Clausewitz, war is only a prolongation or continuation of politics
by special means, which logically requires that political needs determine the con-
clusion. However, recent "wars" have not lent themselves solely to this simple
approach, as can be seen when economic (see note 198, infra), or sociological
Vol. 5
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powers of the President, or of the Congress, or of them both
jointly? If -not war, then at the very least an emergency arises-
but of what kind, and in what degree, and do the President's con-
gressionally-authorized stand-by emergency powers or war powers
become effective? If so, what are the limitations which attach
to these powers and their exercise, 11° and are the constitutional
rights of persons impaired in any way?
171
Insofar as there are distinctions made between emergencies
and wars, there may thus be: economic, 172 sociological, or politi-
reasons enter. See e.g., L. KOTZSCH, THE CONCEPT OF WAR IN CONTEMPORARY
HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 20-22 (1956), and testimony of Zbigniew
Brzezinski before a subcommittee of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee,
reprinted in Los Angeles Times, Sept. 8, 1974, as follows:
The Soviet view of detente--explicitly and openly articulated by Soviet
leaders-is that of a limited and expedient arrangement, which in no
way terminates the ideological conflict even as it yields tangible eco-
nomic benefits. On the contrary, it has been emphasized over and over
again that "peaceful coexistence" is a form of class struggle and that
ideological conflict, far from abating, is to intensify during detente.
This intensified ideological hostility, however, is not to stand in the way
of economic cooperation.
Id., part VII, at 3, col. 1.
170. The Vietnam war was neither a declared war by Congress, nor a defen-
sive war and it was questionably authorized by presidential action and later by
the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; this Resolution was repealed in January,
1971, 84 Stat. 2053, as an amendment to the Foreign Monetary Sales Act. On
further limitations see also text and note 186, infra, and also Forkosch, The Con-
stitutionality of the Vietnam Venture, and a Registrant's Right To Counsel Within
the Selective Service System, 22 S. CAROLINA L. REv. 287 (1970); Wormuth,
Nixon Theory, supra note 87.
171. See discussion below of Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) and refer-
ences therein, and note 207, infra, and text accompanying.
172. A current illustration of an economic war is also seen in the Trade Re-
form Act of 1973, passed by the House but hung up in the Senate because of
opposition to trade concessions to the Soviet Union, and also because of an
amendment by Senator Henry Jackson (D. Wash.) which would deny Export-Im-
port credits and most-favored-nation treatment in tariffs so long as Russia prohib-
its the free emigration of Jews. Additionally, the Senate Finance Committee
seeks a congressional veto power on administration agreements negotiated to ease
non-tariff trade barriers. Of course the "oil war" still proceeding need not be ex-
panded upon, and executive efforts and agreements in this area continue apace.
Of interest here are the comments by President Ford and Secretary of State Kis-
singer which seemingly do not exclude resort to force in an oil emergency.
For an outstanding historical illustration of such an economic emergency
which almost ran into some kind of "war" (Commodore Perry reputedly was
ready so to engage in), see the discussion of the opening of Japan for trade in
1853. R. STRAusz-HuP AND S. POSSONY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 326 et seq.
(1950), and see also the next subdivision on Protection of American Citizens, in
text accompanying notes 195-219, infra. In this latter situation protection can eas-
ily merge into conflagration. At international law, the protection of a nation's citi-
zens requires the meeting of a formula which, under American law, also requires
an act of Congress.
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cal17 3 emergencies or "wars"; 174 local or regional 175 ones; natural
or man-made ones; and so on.176 Also, the President's powers
do not necessarily increase or adjust in each case; and even when
so utilized there are limitations. 177  For example, while the Presi-
dent may immediately and unilaterally act to quell an internal in-
surrection or rebellion, he cannot, willy-nilly, impose martial
law,178 and economic and other emergencies require submission
173. A peripheral illustration is the use of the Central Intelligence Agency
(C.I.A.) and like groups to penetrate, foment, and even engage in clandestine op-
erations which, however, are not "war" and, even though excessive, have some
initial basis in a statute. See also the program begun during the Kennedy Admin-
istration, whereby the International Police Academy (I.P.A.) in Washington,
D.C. trains and aids foreign police officers (as of this writing, from 77 countries).
TIME, May 28, 1973, at 27. In 1963 Venezuelan guerilla forces threatened to
shoot a Caracas policeman daily, whereupon the I.P.A. provided weapons and
training which enabled the Caracas police to defeat the guerillas and prevent dis-
ruption of the national elections scheduled for the following year. The I.P.A. op-
erates under the public safety office of the Agency for International Development.
174. Throughout this article, discussions disclose conduct in non-war fields
which, in certain respects, can nevertheless be and actually are classified as
"wars." See notes 169-70, supra.
175. The Monroe Doctrine, enunciated by President James Monroe in his
Message To Congress of December 2, 1823, and thereafter used in various connec-
tions, was renounced in 1949. The most outstanding (dangerous?) regional emer-
gency was the Cuban Confrontation between President Kennedy and Secretary
Kruschchev in 1962 (although here, of course, the safety of the United States was
allegedly menaced by the unilateral and secret military installations). The Do-
minican intervention of 1965 to protect American citizens is still fresh, and it may
be that the Caracas Resolution of 1954 has superseded such a unilateral concept.
DOCUMENTS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 412 (1955).
176. Congress and the President have given emergencies various descriptive
and qualifying adjectives, such as "distressed emergencies," 48 Stat. 1 (1933), in
preamble; "intensified", Proc. No. 2153, 49 Stat. 3489 (1936); "unprecedented",
60 Stat. 207 (1946); "acute", 48 Stat. 31 (1933); and "unlimited", Proc. No. 2487,
55 Stat. 1547 (1941).
177. There may even be limitations on these limitations, as is the case of judi-
cial withdrawal from any adjudication because of the doctrine of political ques-
tion, on which see notes 149, supra, and 213, infra, and United States v. Sisson,
294 F. Supp. 515, 518 (D.C. Mass. 1968). See also L. STUEzo, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE RIGHT OF WAR 173-91 (B. Carter, transl. 1970);
and Von Elbe, Evolution, supra note 167, and Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation,
37 HARv. L. REv. 338 (1924).
178. For an early American distinction between military law and martial law
see 1 KENT'S COMMENTARiES ON AMERCAN LAw 341, n.a (1926, 1884), and
for a view on the three kinds of military jurisdiction which can be exercised under
the Constitution see Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 139 (1866); see also
the concurring opinion of Justice Chase for a view that "the term 'martial law'
carries no precise meaning," and that "the Constitution does not refer to 'martial
law' at all and no Act of Congress has defined the term," see Justice Black's opin-
ion in Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 315 (1946); and for an in-depth
Vol. 5
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to, or else separate, congressional action. 1 79  This does not mean
that under proper circumstances the President may not proclaim
martial law;' however, he is still subject to a judicial finding that
there is no justification for it under the specific circumstances, as
where the civilian courts are open and functioning.''
And yet, regardless of all the prior discussion in this area,
the author still opines that today the power of the President, as
President, encompasses an unauthorized, unilateral, and unlimited
ability to precipitate and plunge the United States into a war, ex-
tra-legally, extra-constitutionally, and extra-internationally.8 2
Because of his fixed constitutional four-year term in office, he
could then, as commander-in-chief, conduct that war with or even
without congressional acquiescence or support! In effect this
could permit a dictatorship sans constitutionally enacted judicial,
or electoral authority, and subject only to the loyalty and support
of the armed forces. This Orwellian nightmare is a possibility,
albeit an improbability, yet there appear to be no theoretical"3
analysis, see Dennison, Martial Law: The Development Of a Theory of Emer-
gency Powers, 1776-1861, 18 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 52 (1974).
179. Such occurred with the Great Depression of 1929, and the Steel Seizure
Case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), and see
note 184, infra, for references to legislation in these areas.
180. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), where Dorr's Rebel-
lion in Rhode Island in 1942 provided the occasion for a discussion of upholding
martial law when properly exercised in war or insurrection, and see also notes
178, supra, and 181, infra.
181. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 139 (1866); see also discussion
in Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 324, 343 (1946); regarding a Gover-
nor's like powers for his state, see Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932);
see also note 217, infra and Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (where Nazi
saboteurs were landed on Long Island, captured, and tried by a military commis-
sion on United States soil, therefore appears incorrect).
182. This writer is of this opinion even though the War Powers Resolu-
tion of 1973, infra note 192, § 3, requires that "The President in every possible
instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed
Forces into hostilities" (emphasis added); still the House 'Report discloses that
"possible" was inserted to recognize that "a situation may be so dire, e.g., hostile
missile attack underway, and require such instantaneous action that no prior con-
sultation will be possible .... " 2 U.S. CONG. & ADM. NEWS 1973, at 2350-51.
In other words, there is still unlimited ability (deliberately) to misinterpret, and
deliberate human error cannot be guarded against. Separately, what occurs when
the Congress is technically not in session, even though committees and subcom-
mittees may be available?
183. See the even more cogent situation during the Korean (de facto) War,
when President Truman ordered the seizure of some steel mills and was denounced
by the judiciary for this unilateral act. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). In the lower court a colloquy occurred between the
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limitations -upon such a strong-willed individual who is so sup-
ported.1s4
judge and the government attorney during oral argument on the steel companies'
motion for a preliminary injunction, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
103 F. Supp. 569 (D.C.D.C. 1952). At one point the district judge sought to
paraphrase the government's argument, and government counsel replied, both as
follows:
So, when the sovereign people adopted the Constitution, it enumer-
ated the powers set up in the Constitution but limited the powers of the
Congress and limited the powers of the judiciary, but it did not limit
the powers of the Executive. Is that what you say?
That is the way we read Article II of the Constitution.
As I understand it, you do not assert any statutory power.
That is correct.
And you do not assert any express constitutional power.
Well, your Honor, we base the President's power on Sections 1,
2 and 3 of Article II of the Constitution, and whatever inherent, implied
or residual powers may flow therefrom ...
So you contend the executive has unlimited power in time of emer-
gency.
He has the power to take such action as is necessary to meet the
emergency.
If the emergency is great, it is unlimited, is it?
I suppose if you carry it to its logical conclusion, that is true.
Id.
That this exchange between counsel and court did not go unnoticed in the
High Court is found in this sentence in the concurring opinion of Justice Jack-
son:
But no doctrine that the Court could promulgate would seem to me more
sinister and alarming than that a President whose conduct of foreign af-
fairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often even is unknown, can vastly
enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the country by his own
commitment of the Nation's armed forces to some foreign venture.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 642 (1952).
184. The "proof" of these assumptions need not be delineated-they are self-
evident, as was the case with the unilatral decision to release the A-bomb, or
actively to intervene in one of the numerous tinderbox wars in the world and
thereby produce a confrontation. By so pulling himself up by his bootstraps to
commander-in-chief status, and also when there is a declaration of war or an "in-
vasion" by the other power(s), the President's stand-by emergency powers are ac-
tivated, and the magnitude of these powers need not be touched upon. Although
see, e.g., Hearings on S. 731, S.J. Res. 18 and S.). Res. 59 Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), as well as the War
Powers Resolution of 1973, infra note 192; see also, further, Special Committee
on the Termination of the National Emergency, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); the
opening statement at the hearings, and the report, asserting that the nation
[Hias been in a declared state of national emergency since 1933. Very
few are aware that over that period of time the United States Congress
has enacted at least 580 separate sections of the United States Code del-
egating extraordinary powers to the President in time of war or national
emergency.
Id. See also the Committee's (now, Special Committee on National Emergencies
and Delegated Emergency Powers) interim report and proposed "National Emer-
gencies Act," 120 CONG. REc. S. 15,784-94 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974).
Clark Clifford has written that the presidency is a chameleon which takes
VCol. 5
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On a realistic level, however, there are various constitutional
and practical limitations imposed upon the President's ability so
to act, other than those already explored. For example, major
questions arise as to his ability to seize or authorize the seizure
of property at home or abroad,'1 5 or to continue to conduct a
shooting engagement when the congressional base is with-
drawn.' Also, Congress may seek to control the executive,
through measures such as: (1) cutting off appropriations for such
congressionally unauthorized activities; (2) enacting statutes es-
tablishing the policy of the United States requiring conditional
withdrawal of forces; or (3) passing a joint resolution which re-
quires the President to comply with certain procedures in the
event of undeclared wars.
To illustrate these situations, Congress unsuccessfully at-
tempted several times to prevent involvement in Vietnam "unless
specifically authorized" by Congress; the method attempted was
designed to deny the President the use of appropriated moneys.
187
its pattern and color from the personality of the chief executive. Arthur Schlesin-
ger, Jr. has written that any presidential accountability has one grave weakness,
namely, in the field of foreign affairs, as not only the other two departments
but also the people
[F]elt much less sure of their ground, had much less confidence in their
information and judgment, and were therefore much less inclined to
challenge and check and balance, as they did so fully in domestic affairs.
Can Psychiatry Save The Republic?, SATURDAY REvIEW/WORLD, September 7,
1974, at 15.
185. The President is empowered to seize and destroy overseas property of
Americans, without the imposition of just compensation (fifth amendment) re-
quirements, when the property has "become a potential weapon of great signifi-
cance to the invaders," United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 334 U.S. 149,
155 (1952); according to a dissent by Justices Black and Douglas, the President
cannot seize property, even temporarily, within the United States, except in a zone
of war for military use, under the guise of its being necessarily required for con-
ducting a war, United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951), and this
is especially true in times of peace, such as the Steel Seizure Case, Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), and see text accompanying
note 183 supra. However, during the pre-World War II emergency, in 1941, and
basing his authority on the general powers constitutionally invested in him as
President and commander-in-chief, Roosevelt seized an aircraft and a shipbuilding
plant; during the following two years, after the war had begun, he likewise so
seized a cable company, a shell plant, and thousands of coal companies. The War
Labor Disputes Act of June 25, 1943, 57 Stat. 163, eventually provided a statutory
base for these and other seizures.
186. See note 170, supra, and notes following.
187. See the Cooper-Church amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act,
H.R. 15628, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), approved by the Senate 58-37, in 1970
but not found in the act as finally adopted, 84 Stat. 2053. See also the effort
in 1972, via H.R. 14055, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) to cut off, within thirty
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Finally, in 1973, a compromise was reached. In that year both
Houses of Congress agreed that no moneys theretofore or now be-
ing appropriated were to be spent "to support directly or indirectly
combat activity" 18 8 in Southeast Asia; but President Nixon suc-
cessfully vetoed the bill; one week later, however, he signed a
compromise bill providing for an August cut-off, and agreed to
seek prior congressional approval for future military action in In-
dochina. 18 9 The congressional policy on conditional withdrawal
was stated in 1971, when both Houses declared it to be ",the policy
of the United States."'190 to withdraw the armed forces from Indo-
china of American prisoners of war were released. Although he
signed the bill, ,the President felt that it was "without binding force
or effect . "..."191 The enacted War Powers Resolution of
1973192 requires, inter alia, joint consultation by both depart-
ments, in "every possible instance"' 93 prior to the use of American
forces; if, nevertheless, such unilateral use occurs, within forty-
days of enactment, all funds for military operations in Indochina; however, the
proposal never reached the floor of the House. The text uses terms adopted by
the Senate in June, 1973, as an amendment to a final authorization for the De-
partment of State, also aborted.
188. 119 Cong. Rec. S12559 (daily ed. June 29, 1973). The text of the
amendment to the appropriations measure appears as follows:
§ 108: Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, on or after
August 15, 1973, no funds herein or heretofore appropriated may be ob-
ligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by
United States military forces in or over or from off the shores of North
Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.
189. This compromise bill was signed July 1, 1973. On July 25th Congress-
woman Holtzman sued the Secretary of Defense Schlessinger, seeking to enjoin
continued air operations in Cambodia, and obtained a temporary injunction,
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); the intermediate
Court of Appeals stayed this injunction pending an appeal, Holtzman v. Schles-
inger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2nd Cir. 1973), and then Justice Marshall, appealed to as
a circuit justice, refused to vacate that intermediate stay, Holtzman v. Schlesinger,
414 U.S. 1304 (1973). However, Justice Douglas thereafter did vacate the stay,
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1316 (1973), but on the same day Marshall
entered a new stay over Douglas' dissent, Schlesinger v. Holtzman, 414 U.S. 1321
(1973). Thereafter, on the merits, the district court's ruling was reversed by the
intermediate appellate court, Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir.
1973).
190. The Mansfield Amendment became part of the law found in 85 Stat.
423, 430 (1971).
191. 69 U.S. DEP'T STATE BULL. 662 (1973); NEWSWEEK, Nov. 19, 1973, at
39.
192. Over President Nixon's veto, Congress passed the War Powers Resolu-
tion of 1973, P.L. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555. For Background see H.R. REP. No. 93-
287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) and CONG. REP. No. 93-547, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973), and see also note 190, supra.
193. War Powers Resolution of 1973, P.L. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
Vol. 5
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eight hours the President is required to submit to Congress a writ-
ten report giving certain details; and, most importantly, within
sixty calendar days after submitting the -report, the President
"shall terminate any use of United States armed forces"'194 unless
Congress declares war, 'has specifically authorized such use, ex-
tended the 60-day period, or is physically unable to meet because
of an armed attack on the United States.
D. The Protection of American Citizens and Property Abroad
The preceding illustrations have somewhat disclosed the
powers and limitations on the President's external powers through
executive agreements when questions of national survival, war,
police action, and the like are involved. These powers may, per-
haps, also be utilized abroad to protect American citizens and
property, but in a degree and fashion limited somewhat to 'the
peculiarities of the circumstances. The rationale seems to be
based upon what one Secretary of State termed, in 1871, "the cor-
relative rights of allegiance and protection."'195  There is author-
ity which disclaims the exercise of Presidential powers as such for
the protection of American property abroad; congressional au-
thorization is a necessity, for in effect, an act of war is involved.
Insofar as the lives of Americans in foreign countries are con-
cerned, there seems to be a vacillating type of cavilling. How-
ever, this writer views .this situation to be analogous, if not simi-
lar, to that concerning property abroad, 19 and this is true even
194. Id.
195. For the 1871 quotation see 0. SVARLIEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW
OF NATIONS 244 (1955).
196. On the cavilling aspect see, for example, discussion of the Drago Doc-
trine with respect to Latin America, and the Second Hague Conference of 1907,
in C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAw 295-96 (3d ed. 1948); see, further, text and
notes 199 et seq., infra, and the testimony of Henry Steele Commager on March
8, 1971, before the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations, conducting hearings
on S. 731:
I do not know . . . whether even under the Constitution the President
has full power to use Armed Forces to protect property abroad. As I
understand the Drago Doctrine, that notion has been at least questioned
if not repudiated. We subscribe to the Drago Doctrine and we would
not now normally use Armed Forces to protect property. We would not
do today, bombard Greytown, as we did in 1854. I would not myself
include the term "property."
Senator Aiken: Do you think that this wording could be construed
to include investments by Americans abroad?
Dr. Commager: I should hope not. If it were we would be at war
with the Middle Eastern countries. . . . What is involved in protection
of lives is another matter.
1975
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though individuals are ordinarily accorded short shrift for inter-
national and jurisdictional purposes. 19 7  Regardless, and perhaps
because of this, in these situations numerous Presidents have jus-
tified their unilateral determinations and consequent use of power
and force, with or without statutory authorization. Thus, they
have aided U.S. citizens abroad because internal law apparently
recognized or justified such action and because international law
did not necessarily consider it an act of war.'1 8  This writer's
strictissimi views do not, however, coincide in full with the con-
duct of nations and the decisions of the courts.
The aid rendered to American nationals may be direct or in-
direct. That is, it may be economic, as was the 1960 embargo
placed by the United States on practically all exports to Cuba,
as an explicit retaliation for its nationalization of property. Alter-
natively, the aid may be physical, as occurred in the Dominican
intervention of 1965. Separately, there may be an economic con-
frontation of less-than-shooting proportions as with Commodore
Hearings on S. 731, Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 35-36 (1971). This was the War Powers Bill which was finally enacted
in 1973. See text accompanying note 200 infra.
197. See P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 1-42, 68-122 (1947), al-
though where human rights are concerned a shift appears to be in progress. For
example, the United Nations declares and "reaffirms faith in fundamental human
rights," U.N. CHARTER Preamble, whereas the Charter of the League of Nations
was silent; the International Court of Justice has recently lent support to the view
that the Charter imposes such direct obligation, Advisory Opinion, Legal Conse-
quences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa), notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971]
I.C.J. 16, reprinted in 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 145 (1972); see also Schwelb, The Inter-
national Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of the Charter, 66 AM.
J. INT'L L. 337 (1972).
Whether or not different justifications, powers, and juridical rationale are ap-
plied where ambassadors, consuls, etc., or governmental property, abroad are in-
volved, is not here discussed. See H. BRIoGs, THE LAW OF NATIONS 960-64 (2d
ed. 1952).
198. See the situations from 1798 to 1941 given by J. ROGERS, WORLD POLIC-
ING AND THE CONSTITUTION 92-134 (1945), and J. CLARK, RIGHT TO PROTECT Crr-
IZENS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES BY LANDING FORCES (1934) (a memorandum pre-
pared while Solicitor of the Department of State).
There may have been much to say for this international attitude in past cen-
turies and decades, but a much more sophisticated approach is required in these
days of tinder-box conflagrations multiplied by the spread of atomic techniques
and use. Reconsideration, re-evaluation, and re-casting may be in order today,
whether or not under U.N. auspices, but the pace of events brings into focus new
situations and new forces. See the combined Anglo-French-Israeli expedition
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Perry and Japan, or an actual economic-political armed conflict
as occurred in the Bay of Pigs "invasion" of 1961.199 Other na-
tions follow suit, as, for example, in the armed attack by England,
France, and Israel on Egypt in 1956, where the Prime Minister's
justification to Parliament included the statement that there was
nothing in any treaty (or the United Nations' Charter) "which ab-
rogates the right of a Government to take such steps -as are es-
sential to protect the lives of their citizens and vital [property]
rights such as are here at stake . . "..200 But where no such
rationale is presented then recourse may be found in other justifi-
cations.2 °1
Whether done by others20 2 or by the United States,203 what
internal limitations are found in the Constitution in these situa-
tions? "Now, as respects the interposition of the Executive
abroad, for the protection of the lives or property of the citi-
zen,'2°4 cavalierly opines one 1860 lower court decision, "the duty
must, of necessity, rest in the discretion of -the President ....
Today, one is tempted to take issue with this statement; but, accept-
ing the quotation does not necessarily mean accepting an unregu-
lated, uncontrolled, and unfounded discretion. Is an unauthorized
199. On this last point see A. SCHLESINGER, JR., A THOUSAND DAYS 233-97
(1965).
200. Quoted by Lauterpacht, The Contemporary Practice of the United King-
dom in the Field of International Law-Survey and Comment, Ill, 6 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 301, 326 (1957), wherein it also appears that the Foreign Secretary
commented that "self-defense undoubtedly includes a situation where the lives of
the State's nationals abroad are in imminent danger. . .," (continuing, and giving
illustrations where intervention might be necessary). Id. at 327. For a like ex-
pression by the Lord Chancellor in an extended analysis, see Id. at 328. The
United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, repudiated the particular use
of force under these circumstances, although agreeing generally that there could
be circumstances justifying the use of force. First Emergency Special Session,
November 1, 1956.
201. This point will not be pursued further as it is not relevant to the present
discussion. See, however, for the withdrawal by France, and the United States
take-over of its role, in Vietnam, R. FALK, LEGAL ORDER IN A VIOLENT WORLD
224-323 (1968).
202. For example Great Britain invaded the waters of the United States and
destroyed a boat, during the 1837 Canadian Rebellion; the boat was being used
by Americans to carry arms to the rebels. See 2 MOORE, DIGEST, supra note
136, at 24, 409.
203. During the Boxer Rebellion in 1901, the Chinese government permitted
foreign powers to defend their Peking legations, Id. at V, 478 et seq., and see
analysis by F. GROB, THE RELATIVITY OF WAR AND PEACE 64-79 (1949).
204. Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111 (No. 4, 186) (S.D.N.Y. 1860).
205. Id.
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discretion subject to any rules or limitations? The reasoning is
analogical. We begin with the division heretofore given between
the power of the Congress and the President, respectively and
ordinarily ,to declare and then conduct a war. These powers are
not unlimited; 06 however, the one here discussed is found in the
constitutional rights granted to an American citizen abroad, so
long as the United States has jurisdiction (and control) over him.
Assuming such jurisdiction, -these constitutional rights are limita-
tions upon the entire United States Government.10 7  Put differ-
ently, the right to protection, as just ,mentioned, is not the only
such right, for this assumes a form and substance of foreign juris-
diction over the American national or property abroad. But
where the United States itself seeks to exercise jurisdiction outside
its own territory and on that of another friendly nation, whether
by force20 8 or by agreement, one issue to be resolved is the ex-
tent to which the constitutional rights of the citizen limit the power
of the President (through the armed forces overseas). Separately
and additionally, it may be conceded that 'the "organizing. . . and
disciplining 2 °9 of the armed forces, and their "[r]egulation,
''210
are confided to the Congress; but even so, that body cannot, at
all times and places and circumstances, act without limitations.
211
Pari passu, the President is likewise so bound, so "that no [execu-
tive] agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the
Congress, or on any other branch of the Government, which is
free from the restraints of 'the Constitution.
'212
Where a shooting war is in progress then, perhaps, different
considerations may attach to both internal and external situations.
The judiciary, in such a case, may defer to -the other two political
departments the decision of: when a war of belligerency has
occurred; 218 whether on the west coast of the United States the
206. See note 165, supra, and authority cited therein.
207. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6, 16 (1947); see also note 57, supra,
and text accompanying.
208. See note 203, supra, and for example the statutory authorization in the
Joint Resolution of 1914, 38 Stat. 770, which alluded to "certain affronts and in-
dignities committed against the United States in Mexico" and then authorized the
President to employ "the armed forces. . . to enforce his demand for unequivocal
amends. . . ." Id.
209. U.S. CONsr., art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
210. Id., cl. 14.
211. See note 207, supra.
212. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
213. See The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635,
Vol. 5
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probabilities of an invasion by Japan are such as executively to
question the loyalty, and judicially sanction the mass relocation, of
Japanese citizens at the outbreak of World War II;214 or a proper
declaration of validly applied martial war.21 But whether an in-
vasion is threatened, actual, present and real, is not -to be unilater-
ally determined and continued by the executive branch. Hence
after the war and where the courts are open and available, such
a presidential power may be challenged and found not to exist.216
Although during the war the judiciary may, perhaps, lack eager-
ness to review the proceedings of a military commission, 217 still,
as has occurred, writs of habeas corpus may be brought. And,
while a seizure and destruction of the private property of Ameri-
cans on foreign soil so as to prevent it from being captured and
used by the advancing enemy will not -authorize compensation, 21s
a seizure within the United States requires the payment of just
compensation under the fifth amendment's eminent domain
clause.
21 9
E. Executive Secrecy, Information, Privilege and the Legislature
The belief of Woodrow Wilson that international treaties and
-agreements could be open, as well as openly arrived at, was and
is, of course, a delusion.220 Every nation, domestically and inter-
170 (1863), and note 177 supra, although in that case, the Court determined the
matter for itself on the facts before it.
214. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 92 (1943); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), although this disgraceful episode was punctu-
ated by the almost immediate softening of the impact, via judicial loopholes, these
"concentration camps" were still upheld, Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
For retired Chief Justice Warren's regret at his share in this episode, when he
was the attorney general for California, see Los Angeles Times, July 14, 1974,
Part I, at 1, col. 2.
215. See discussion in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 142 (1866).
216. Id. at 127, although see distinction made in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S.
1 (1942).
217. Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1864), although as to
the power of a governor to proceed within his state, see the judicial reservation
of power in Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 278 (1932).
218. See United States v. Caltex (Phillippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 155
(1952), with two dissents.
219. U.S. CONST., amend. V; United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114
(1951); see also Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1852), although
compare with the Steel Seizure Case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
354 U.S. 579 (1952), where no war was in progress.
220. See C. FRIED RIcH, THE PATHOLOGY OF POLITICS 1 (1972), that conspir-
acy, espionage, etc. on the international scene are "political phenomena that are
ubiquitous, though universally condemned...." Id.
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nationally,221 practices secrecy. The only question is the extent
and degree. Even the late Justice Robert H. Jackson, a foe of
unregulated power, conceded that executive secrecy in foreign
policy was a necessity, and that "[i]t would be intolerable that
courts, without the relevant information, should review and per-
haps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information prop-
erly held secret . '.. 22 All three departments of the United
States need, sometimes desperately, a degree of secrecy in their
functionings; so do the people themselves .22  Even the 1966
Freedom of Information Act 224 contains exemptions225 as to its
applicability, and has not beern satisfactorily construed or ap-
plied.228  A similar bill was recently introduced into both Houses
221. See the key finding made by the Senate Subcommittee on Multinational
Corporations in its investigation of Aramco and its four American stockholders
when, in May, 1973, and acting under orders of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, these
corporations sought to influence the American public and opinion in a variety of,
and sometimes devious, ways, reporting all this back to the King. See Los Ange-
les Times, August 7, 1974, Part I, at 7, col. 1. See also the effort by the United
Nations to have made public the executed documents, note 116, supra, and text
accompanying.
222. Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333
U.S. 103, 111 (1948), although it should be noted that four Justices felt that in
this case the President had no exclusive authority, sans legislative delegation, and
so review was possible. Assuming, therefore, an "inherent" Presidential power,
or proper delegation validly exercised, it would then appear that secrecy is a neces-
sary companion to most such negotiations.
223. E.g., statutes relating to the confidentiality of income tax returns, as well
as other (private) information gathered by the government; the bank secrecy act;
educational, arrest, credit, and other records and their necessitous secrecy. Al-
though see also note 224, infra. The common, and additionally the statutory, law
has recognized a variety of "secret" relationships, such as where the expectation
of privacy has resulted in a confidentiality imposed and guaranteed by courts in
and out of judicial proceedings wherever possible. For example, the relationship
of lawyer-client, doctor-patient, priest-penitent, patient-psychotherapist, witness-
grand jury testimony, husband-wife, accountant-client, as well as the records-situ-
ation above mentioned, see, e.g., CAL. Evm. CODE §§ 930-1060 (West, 1975).
This area of private "secrecy," whether from government or person, is so huge
that volumes have dealt with it; it is here merely suggested so as to disclose a
government's like required need.
224. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970). There is presently
before the Congress a sheaf of amendments to this Act: specifically see that of
Senator Philip Hart (D-Mich.) seeking to broaden citizen access to F.B.I. and
other law enforcement files. This has been accepted by the House conferees. See
specifically S. 1142.
225. These specific exemptions are to be narrowly construed in the light of
the liberal disclosure requirement. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823, n.11
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
226. See, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1-9), and Environmental Protection Agency v.
Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973); Epstein v. Resor, 296 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Cal. 1969),
aff'd, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
Vol. 5
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of Congress to correct, by statute, the operation of the security
classification system instituted under an executive order. 227  The
first such exemption provides that the act does not apply to mat-
ters "specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret
in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy. '228  Even
though another section unequivocally states that the act "is not au-
thority ,to withhold information from Congress,"229 ,this exception
to ,the imitation has been honored more in the breach than 'the
observance.
2 0
The entire area of governmental secrecy is still in a state of
chaos, for there is no question but that the judiciary is most secre-
tive in its deliberations, and the Congress operates primarily via
committees whose deliberations are ordinarily secret. Even the
impeachment subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee so
acted, despite some of its 'televised hearings. The brunt of -the
anti-secrecy approach by the legislative and judicial departments
is the executive. Here any limitations and restrictions involving
foreign and international relations are not only germane to our
inquiry but clearly relate to proper conduct by the President and
his advisers. For example, limitations on secrecy could be sub-
stantially detrimental to delicate negotiations by Secretary of State
227. The apparent intent is to replace Exec. Order No. 11, 652, 32 C.F.R.
1900 (Supp. 1974) by amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, supra note
224, via H.R. 12004, introduced December 18, 1973, and S. 3399 introduced April
30, 1974. See also, other bills introduced prior to S. 3399, and on all of which
hearings were held and an analysis and compendium printed, Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), and STAFF OF SENATE COMM.
ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, REPORT ON FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
(Comm. Print 1970).
228. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(c).
229,. Id.
230. Although see, e.g., Renegotiations Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co.,
415 U.S. 1 (1974), wherein the Court stated that Congress was primarily con-
cerned with opening up the administrative agencies and their processes to the scru-
tiny of the press and the general public when it passed the act. The most widely-
known incident is, of course, the Pentagon Papers Case, where the surreptitious
copying and later publication of documents (and allegedly unlawful taking) relat-
ing to the background of the involvement and subsequent action by the United
States in Vietnam, which at first resulted in a civil injunction action, was eventu-
ally dismissed because, for one reason, the papers were (for political reasons?)
then history! New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 et seq. (1971)
(concurrence by Justice Black); a later criminal action against Daniel Ellsberg
and his conferee, was also eventually dismissed (also for political reasons?).
NEwSWEEK, May 21, 1973, at 25; TIME, May 21, 1973, at 28; NEW REPUBLIC,
May 26, 1973, at 9.
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Henry Kissinger in his efforts in the Near East, 'his Chinese diplo-
macy, and the interplay in Cyprus.
Besides the question of governmental (especially executive)
secrecy, there emerges the parallel question of executive privi-
lege. This is a broad, amorphous concept which also umbrellas
presidentially appointed officials and aides within that establish-
ment. The simplistic rationale is that the Chief Executive must
-be able 'to communicate in complete privacy and confidence with
all persons, regardless of nationality, status, rank, and so forth,
when engaged in his presidential functions.23' This required ex-
ecutive confidentiality arises out of the nature of the President's
position and may be analogized to the judiciary's and legislature's
like needs.232 For example, Senator Mike Gravel (D.-Alaska) as
chairman of a Senate subcommittee, obtained all forty-seven vol-
umes of the Defense Department's study of Vietnam policy, all
bearing a top secret security classification, and placed them all in
the public record at one of its meetings. He subsequently ar-
ranged with the aid of Leonard Rodberg, a member of his staff,
for publication of the study by a private publisher, whereupon a
federal grand jury, investigating possible criminal conduct in such
release and publication, subpoenaed Rodberg. The Senator in-
tervened and sought to quash 'the subpoena, relying on his privi-
lege under the speedh or debate clause.2 3 The Supreme Court
231. There is an open question whether a President's private and non-govern-
mental functions are not also so covered, and as of this moment, it appears that
until disclosed not to be, or until the burden of proof is met by the one claiming
non-confidentiality, all executive acts are within the ambit of the privilege. See,
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
232. During the inquiry by the impeachment subcommittee (see notes 235-
236 infra on other aspects), its chairman sought to impose limitations of confiden-
tiality and secrecy on its hearings and deliberations, with leaked information and
publication inveighed against. So too, the question of confidentiality was judici-
ally rejected as a defense in a newspaperman's refusal to reveal the sources of
his information. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (involving three sep-
arate cases of refusals to appear and testify before federal and state grand juries
and reveal sources or information because of first amendment rights, in all three
cases the privilege being there denied). The State of California has expressly rec-
ognized this privilege. See CAL. Evm. CODE § 1060 (West 1975).
It is not amiss to conjecture on the ability of a President, during a period
when his authority, integrity, and even honor are being questioned internally
(with or without impeachment proceedings being initiated), to continue function-
ing in external affairs, on which see, e.g., Roberts, Foreign Policy Under a Para-
lyzed Presidency, 52 FOREIGN AFFAIRs 67.5 (1974). The question is also pertinent
for an incoming President under the twenty-fifth amendment, as is the case with
President Gerald R. Ford.
233. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
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agreed that Rodberg was ordinarily shielded by the Senator's priv-
ilege, but not, in this instance, from responding to questions rele-
vant to tracing the source of the document, because no legislative
act or conduct or deliberation was involved.23
In the case of the Watergate records and tapes, President
Nixon and his aides sought to assert this privilege in the name
of "national security," also a term of indefinite meaning, claimed
whenever a cover-up need was present. The invocation of a na-
tional security-executive privilege defense was used to repel ef-
forts to obtain certain documents by the separate but somewhat
parallel investigations of the special prosecutor and the Senate Se-
lect Committee investigating that incident, and the House subcom-
mittee investigating grounds for impeachment. The right of the
special prosecutor to compel production, despite the assertion of
the privilege, was upheld, whereas that of the Senate and House
Committees was denied.2"' However, in neither instance was
there a Supreme Court review, and it was not until a subpoena
duces tecum was issued in a criminal proceeding against the Presi-
dent's former attorney general (and others), directing -the Presi-
dent to produce tapes and documents in that matter, that -the Su-
preme Court finally entered the fray. It proceeded, inter alia,
to hold: that a President indeed had and could assert an executive
privilege for himself and his establishment; but, that the Chief Ex-
ecutive had -no absolute executive privilege which could be inter-
preted, asserted, and maintained unilaterally as against the judi-
ciary;2" 6 that such a claimed executive privilege was ,to be treated
differently from a claimed layman's privilege, and in so proceed-
ing against the President, his confidential presidential communica-
tions were "presumptively privileged; 237 but, that the privilege,
,here based on confidentiality, had to be weighed against the legiti-
mate 'needs of the judicial process and the competing interests re-
234. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972), although see Justice
Douglas' dissenting views stating, inter alia, that
Most discussions [on the secrecy of' documents in the executive depart-
ment] have centered on the scope of the executive privilege in stamping
documents as "secret", -"top secret," "confidential," and so on, thus with-
holding them from the eyes of Congress and of the Dress. The practice
has reached large '[and uncontrolled?] proportions.
Id. at 637-44.
235. In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973), upheld in an
en banc decision (5-2) in Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
236. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
237. Id. at 708.
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solved "in a manner that preserves the essential functions of each
-branch."'238 When such a balancing was performed in that case,
the scales now tipped in favor of disclosure.23 9
Of particular interest here is one sentence by the Chief Jus-
tice:
To read the Art. .H powers of the President as providing an
absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential to the en-
forcement of criminal statutes on no more than a generalized
claim of the public interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary
and nondiplomatic discussions would upset the constitutional
balance of 'a workable government' and gravely impair the
role of the courts under Art. 111.240
Whether or not this may constitute a determination that "nondip-
lomatic discussions" are -to be distinguished from "diplomatic dis-
cussions," so that now an absolute executive privilege may be as-
serted and respected is questionable; for we are back again in the
Serbonian bog of unilateral determination, with secrecy and class-
ifications now applying on a rubber-stamp basis. It is opined that
a workable judicial approach would be to require an initial sub-
stantial and prima facie documentary showing by the person de-
siring the material that it is not within the realm of "diplomatic
discussions," then to hold a preliminary hearing on the contrary
contention raising such issue, unless the contrary papers are so
convincing that nothing further -need be shown. At such a pre-
liminary hearing, evidence would be tendered on both sides and
the issue resolved, with review thereafter possible on this deter-
mination; if the matter is finally resolved against the President,
the procedures should be sufficiently 'tight -to guard against undue
and overly-sufficient disclosure. In all of ithis, one element in
the scales should be the question whether foreign (and United
States) diplomats and officials may be inhibited in their relations,
discussions, and communications when such -a judicial sword hangs
suspended over their actions and deliberations.
M. CONCLUSION
Constitutional powers and limitations in the area of interna-
tional relations abound, as has been seen, but there is no definitive
238. Id.
239. The Court then went into the manner of implementation in the District
Court, at 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974).
240. Id. at 707.
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understanding of their meaning. The executive and judicial inter-
pretations have conflicted, the legislative conflict with the execu-
tive over power and jurisdiction has flourished, and there comes
through a hopeless feeling that no concrete resolution will ever
occur. The classic "muddling through" which characterized the
British Empire during the nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries seems to have become American procedure in the area here
explored; unfortunately, the judicial branch has not done much
to cut these terminological and conceptual knots.
Certain basics in constitutional law do appear and sometimes
do apply. For example, the Constitution's applicability in war and
in peace, here and abroad (where American jurisdiction is
found), is conceded; yet in practice the lip service by the execu-
tive seems to obscure much of the Constitution's actual usurpa-
tion. To the preceding must be added congressional immobility,
acquiescence, and even cooperation in permitting this executive
domination and unconstitutional arrogation of power. The murk-
iness of the judicial waters enables the determined executive
branch to accomplish what it otherwise might be unable to do;
however, this does not mean that such conduct thereby becomes
haloed constitutionally.
Congressional awareness, sophistication, and seeming pres-
ent determination augur a different future vis-ii-vis executive ac-
tion sans statutory authorization. The President's jurisdiction will
undoubtedly be re-examined legislatively and judicially, and new
values and emphases indicate new or modified decisions. Even
if the Supreme Court hesitates to overturn its hoary holdings and
language, and in effect gives its imprimatur to a continuation of
past practices, still, in the long run, the power of Congress over
the purse, over foreign commerce, and, ultimately, its war powers,
denote a new balance in foreign relations -and affairs. Whether
or not a body comprising 535 individuals can ever involve itself
in the day-by-day affairs of the nation overseas is not relevant;
conceding that it cannot does not concede that it thereby abdicates
its authority to paint with broad strokes the foreign policy and prac-
tices of the United States, or to grant authority -to its presidential
delegatee when so desired, or to limit all who drink at the legisla-
tive fount.
As a matter of national policy this reassertion, not redistri-
bution, of powers is all for the good. A Cincinnatus may be re-
quired under certain circumstances, but even he was not contin-
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ued. Whether by one man or many, the powers that are wielded
must also be discontinued once their purposes have been accomp-
lished. Emergencies do not last forever, else they no longer re-
main such; delegations do not result in transfers of power but only
in utilizations as granted and limited temporarily. And, though
not finally, the Constitution's underpinnings include a fear of un-
limited power, of placing much power in the hands of one person,
and of also insisting upon checks and balances for each branch
of government. Whether by an individual, a body, a department,
or a delegatee, there is a constitutional rejection of the unlimited,
absolute, or uncontrolled exercise of any authority; power is
feared and limited.
The major conclusion is that in the area of international af-
fairs, the basic authority to formulate policy has been constitu-
,tionally placed in -the hands of Congress; that while the nation's
,affairs in this -area -are handled directly and immediately by the
President, still, in the end, he is subject to the Congress. Even
-in this atomic age of fear, confrontation, and preparedness there
has been no inability on the part of the nation to act swiftly and
competently, for Congress has delegated much and can delegate
more-but conditionally, temporarily, and always subject to recall.
The Constitution so provides and should .be so construed.
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